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I. Introduction 
Sonia Sotomayor was nominated as an Associate Justice to the Supreme Court of the 
United States by President Barack Obama on May 26, 2009. 1 Justice Sotomayor's subsequent 
confirmation and assumption of her role as Associate Justice on August 8, 2009 made Supreme 
Court history as Justice Sotomayor is only the third woman and the first Hispanic to sit on this 
nation's most prestigious bench.2 Justice Sotomayor was well suited to become a Supreme Court 
Justice as she brought 18 years of federal judgeship experience with her to the Supreme Court as 
she previously served as a federal district judge in the Southern District of New York, and as a 
circuit judge serving the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 3 Along with her occupational 
experience, Justice Sotomayor brought with her the many experiences she gained throughout her 
life growing up in the Bronxdale Housing Projects in the Bronx, New York, her Ivy League 
undergraduate education at Princeton University, and her Ivy League legal education which was 
obtained at Yale Law School.4 These experiences have influenced and continue to shape her 
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court as hints of her strong academic resume, her devotion to 
careful, commonsense application of the law to the facts, and her diverse roots in the Bronx can 
be found in her written opinions. 
This paper will analyze how Justice Sotomayor's life experiences and her diligence in 
performing her role as an Associate Justice have led her to apply a no-nonsense approach to her 
legal jurisprudence. It will be demonstrated that Justice Sotomayor's background and her desire 
to become a judge strongly influences her legal perspective and analysis. Justice Sotomayor 
1 Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court of the U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about!biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
2 Id.; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2009, available at 
www .nytimes.com/2009/05/27 /us/politics/27websotomayor .html. 
3 Id. -
4 Sonia Sotomayor, My Beloved World 13 (Alfred A. Knopf2013). 
1 
employs a narrow, diligent, and in depth analysis of the law and facts in front of her in order to 
draw commonsense conclusions that are often technical, incremental, and exhaustive. 5 The 
structure of Justice Sotomayor's opinions, concurrences, and dissents are fairly predictable; a 
thorough analysis of the facts of the case, a description of the case's procedural posture, an in-
depth and technical explanation of the current law, an acknowledgment of the oppositions stance, 
an often narrow, commonsense application of the law to the facts, and a conclusion. 
Pundits theorize that Justice Sotomayor is squarely entrenched in the liberal bloc of the 
Supreme Court.6 However, an examination of her jurisprudence indicates that Justice Sotomayor 
applies a methodical analysis to the cases and controversies on which she is sitting to reach 
conclusions based soundly on the law and logic. Justice Sotomayor provided insight into her 
legal analysis in an interview with Scott Pelley for the program, 60 Minutes, when asked if the 
constitution is a living document or should be read strictly. Justice Sotomayor stated: 
[T]here are provisions that are very general in the constitution. 
You can't have an unreasonable search and seizure. What does 
unreasonable mean? What's a search and seizure? On those three 
words; search, seizure, and unreasonable, law books are filled. 
Shelves and shelves of them are filled. And so to talk about strict 
interpretation or living constitution, those are not words I use, and 
they're not words that I think have much meaning, because what 
you are doing is interpreting new facts to an established law, that 
in part has been given meaning in precedent, and that in part has a 
historical background, and you're drawing from all of that toolbox, 
of precedence, history (some of my colleagues don't rely on 
history, others do), and from statutory construction principles. It is 
not about reading words strictly or about living constitution, it's 
about giving meaning on the basis of facts that are presented to 
you.7 
5 Adam Liptak, Nominee's Rulings are Exhaustive but Often Narrow, N.Y. Times, May 26,2009, available at 
www .nytimes.com/2009/05/27 /us/politics/27judge.html. 
6 Stolberg, supra note 2, at 6. 
7 Interview with Scott Pelley, Correspondent, 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Jan. 13, 2013), available at 
www .cbsnews .com/news/justice-sotomayor-prefers-sonia-from-the-bronx -09-06-20 13/. 
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Exemplified by Justice Sotomayor's words on 60 Minutes, she employs all of the tools at her 
disposal to reach conclusions regarding facts she is presented with that is based on law, logic, 
and commonsense. Through an analysis of Justice Sotomayor's upbringing, early life, 
undergraduate and legal education, and Supreme Court case law authored by her, this paper will 
provide comprehensive analyses on her commonsense application of the law to the specific facts 
presented to her. 8 
II. Biography 
A. Justice Sotomayor's Early Life 
Sonia Sotomayor was born in the Bronx, New York on June 25, 1954 to her Puerto Rican 
parents, Juan and Celina Sotomayor.9 Justice Sotomayor's parents immigrated to the United 
States in 1944.1° Celina Baez came to the United States with the Women's Army Corps, and 
Juan Sotomayor and his family came in search of work as part of a large, economic driven 
migration to the United States from Puerto Rico. 11 Sotomayor has a brother, Juan Luis 
Sotomayor Jr., M.D., whom she called Junior and was born three years after Justice Sotomayor 
in 1957. 12 The Sotomayor's moved into the Bronxdale Housing Projects in Soundview, a 
neighborhood in the Bronx, New York, around the time Justice Sotomayor's brother was born. 13 
8See, e.g.,Bullcomingv. New Mexico, 131 ·S. Ct. 2705 (2011);JD.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P 'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Chamber of 
Commerce of the US. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 
1723 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010); Krupski v. 
Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
9 Sonia Sotomayor, The Oyez Project at liT Chicago-Kent College of Law, www.oyez.org/justices/sonia_sotomayor 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013). 
10 Sotomayor, supra note 4, at 12. 
11 Jd. 
12 /d. 
13 ld. 
3 
In her book, My Beloved World, she described that the move to the Bronxdale Projects 
isolated their family. 14 This was due in large part to her father's alcoholism. 15 As a result of her 
father's drinking, the family never had visitors, and whenever Justice Sotomayor played with or 
had a sleepover with her cousins, it was always away from home. 16 The Sotomayor's developed 
a routine where her father would cook dinner every night, and then retire to his bedroom leaving 
Sonia and Junior to do their homework until it was time for bed. 17 Justice Sotomayor stated that 
her mother's coping mechanism was absenteeism. 18 Celina worked the night shift at a nearby 
hospital as a practical nurse, allowing her to avoid being home when her husband was. 19 
Justice Sotomayor's father's alcoholism caused a great deal of emotional anguish for her. 
She stated, "My father's neglect made me sad, but I intuitively understood that he could not help 
, ) 
~ I" 
himself; my mother's neglect made meAat her."20 Her unique ability to understand context clues 
and her emotional awareness developed as a result of this situation, as she explained, "However 
much was said at home, and loudly, much also went unsaid, and in that atmosphere I was a 
watchful child constantly scanning the adults for cues and listening in on their conversations. 
My sense of security depended on what information I could glean, any clue dropped 
inadvertently when they didn't realize a child was paying attention."21 
Justice Sotomayor's sense of responsibility and independence grew exponentially as a 
result of her father's drinking and her mother's absence. One occasion that stuck with Justice 
Sotomayor was when her father was sick, and her mother took him to the hospital. Justice 
Sotomayor's aunt and uncle came to the Sotomayor's apartment to get the children, and Justice 
14 ld. at 12-13. 
15 Jd. 
16 !d. at 13. 
17 Jd. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 Jd. at 13-14. 
21 Id. at 14. 
4 
Sotomayor overhead them referring to their apartment as a pigsty, and commenting on how there 
were dishes in the sink and no toilet paper in the bathroom.22 Justice Sotomayor, speaking of 
that experience, stated, "After that I washed the dishes every night, even the pots and pans, as 
soon as we finished dinner. I also dusted the living room once a week. Even though no one ever 
came over, the house was always clean. And when I went shopping with Papi on Fridays, I 
made sure we bought toilet paper. "23 
An experience that truly evinced Sotomayor's destiny to become a Justice on the 
Supreme Court was when she was diagnosed with diabetes. Sotomayor was diagnosed with 
diabetes before she turned eight years old.24 In describing her diagnosis, Justice Sotomayor 
stated, "To my family, the disease was a deadly curse. To me, it was more a threat to the already 
fragile world of my childhood, a state of constant tension punctuated by explosive discord, all of 
it caused by my father's alcoholism and my mother's response to it, whether family fight or 
emotional flight. But the disease also inspired in me a kind of precocious self-reliance that is not 
uncommon in children who feel the adults around them to be unreliable."25 
Justice Sotomayor's independence and desire to settle conflict thrived through her 
diabetes. Justice Sotomayor described awaking one morning to the sound of her parents arguing 
about administering Sotomayor's insulin shot.26 The argument went back and forth between her 
mother and father; her father explaining that he was afraid he would hurt Sonia because his 
hands were shaking so much; her mother retorting that she had to work to support the family, 
explaining she had to do everything and that there would be times when she would not be home 
22 ld at 15. 
23 ld 
24 Jd at 11. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 3. 
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to administer the shots.27 Justice Sotomayor explained, "The needles hurt, but the screaming was 
worse. It made me feel tired, carrying around the weight of their sadness. It was bad enough 
when they were fighting about the milk, or the housework, or the money, or the drinking. The 
last thing I wanted was for them to fight about me."28 Justice Sotomayor then came to a 
profound realization for a seven year old, as she stated, "It then dawned on me: if I needed to 
have these shots every day for the rest of my life, the only way I'd survive was to do it myself."29 
At seven years old, Sonia Sotomayor was not only substantially contributing to her family 
through cleaning and shopping, but she was also administering her own insulin shots, which, at 
the time, encompassed lighting the gas stove with a match and boiling water in order to sterilize 
the needle and syringe.30 Unknowingly, Sonia Sotomayor had already started her path to the 
Supreme Court. At such an early age, she had learned self-discipline, independence, and how to 
observe a conflict and artfully resolve it on her own. 
Justice Sotomayor would also overcome and persevere through another devastating 
experience in her early life that further lead to the development of her independence and 
maturity: the death of her father. Sonia Sotomayor was nine when her father passed away.31 On 
that fateful April day, Justice Sotomayor and Junior were walking directly home from school 
because their father stayed home sick from work. 32 
When the children got home, "I looked into the living room and saw many faces looking 
back at me with the same teary gaze. Mami was sitting in the chair by the telephone in the 
hallway, staring into space, her eyes wide and wet. Junior said to her, 'Where's Papi?'"33 
27 ld 
28 ld at 3-4. 
29 Jd at 3. 
30 ld at 4. 
31 ld at 40. 
32 ld 
33 ld at 41. 
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Sotomayor's mother then said, '"Dios se lo llevo."'34 Justice Sotomayor continued, "God took 
him. I could see that Junior didn't understand. I did. She meant that Papi had died. But what 
did that mean? I didn't know what I was supposed to feel, or say, or do."35 Sonia ran down the 
hallway and into a bedroom where she began to cry and pound her fists, when Ana came into the 
room and told her to be a big girl, and to be strong for her mother.36 Sotomayor, only nine years 
old, was now a diabetic with an alcoholic father who had just died, and she had to be strong for 
her mother. Shortly thereafter the Sotomayor's moved into a new apartment in the Bronxdale 
Projects because her mother could not go back into the one in which Sonia's father passed.37 
Sonia's mother was also able to change her schedule to enable her to be home when the children 
got home from schoo1.38 
Justice Sotomayor's life did not get any easier after the passing of her father, but it was 
another opportunity for growth and perseverance. Justice Sotomayor explained, "In the days and 
weeks following the funeral, the release and relief I felt from the end of the fighting gave way to 
anxious puzzlement. At nine, I was equipped to understand loss, even sadness, but not grief, not 
someone else's and certainly not my own. I couldn't figure out what was wrong with Mami, and 
it scared me."39 When Sonia and Junior would come home from school every day, even though 
their mother changed her schedule in order to be home, they would find the apartment dark, with 
the curtains drawn. 40 Their mother would come out from her bedroom long enough to cook 
34 ld. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 I d. at 44. 
38 ld. 
39 I d. at 46. 
40 ld. 
7 
dinner, to apathetically serve dinner, and retire back to her room, leaving Sonia and Junior to 
once again do homework and watch television by their lonesome.41 
After an entire summer of incomprehension of her mother's grief, Sonia and Junior went 
back to school. Justice Sotomayor was unable to tolerate her mother's isolation any longer, and 
one day upon returning home from school, she expressed her emotion. 42 Sonia pounded with 
both hands on her mother's closed door and screamed at her, stating, '"Enough! You've got to 
stop this! You're miserable and you're making us miserable ... What's wrong with you? Papi 
died. Are you going to die too? Then what happens to me and Junior? Stop already, Mami, stop 
it!"'43 Sonia's mother stood in her room, blank faced, as Sonia then ran into her rom and cried 
herself to sleep. 44 
Without realizing it, young Justice Sotomayor had saved her family further anguish once 
again. The next day, upon returning home from school, the window shades were up and the 
radio was playing, and their mother was wearing a dress, makeup, and perfume: Sonia felt relief 
throughout her entire body. 45 Reflecting on this experience, Sonia explained that the memories 
of her childhood are bifurcated between the claustrophobia of home, and the expansive joy of the 
outside world and her family; but the largest contrast was between life before and after her father 
died.46 After Sonia's emotional explosion, home was now a good place to be.47 
Through her mother's self-imposed exile, Sonia's academic prowess would develop. 
Justice Sotomayor explained, "My solace and only distraction that summer was reading. I 
discovered the pleasure of chapter books and devoured a big stack of them. The Parkchester 
41 Jd. 
42 !d. at 49. 
43 ld. at 50. 
44 Jd. 
45 !d. at 65. 
46 ld. 
47 ld. at 66. 
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Library was my haven. To thumb through the card catalog was to touch an infinite bounty, more 
books than I could ever possibly exhaust."48 As a result of her incessant summer reading, Sonia 
began to thrive at school.49 Sonia not only improved because of her love for books however, but 
also because the Sotomayor's began speaking English at home. 50 The switch to English had a 
profound impact on Sonia's academic performance and capabilities, and it instilled the 
importance of education in Sonia. 51 Sonia's devotion to her own education was inspired by her 
mother, as Sonia stated, '"You've got to get your education! It's the only way to get ahead in the 
world.' That was her constant refrain, and I could no more get it out of my head than a 
commercial I'd heard a thousand times."52 
Fifth grade was an extremely important year for Sonia's intellectual development, as 
several highly influential events came to pass. The first was when Sonia's mother had a visitor 
one afternoon. Sonia overhead her mother and this man speaking of priceless knowledge with 
reasonable monthly payments that give access to as much information as a library of a thousand 
books. 53 When the complete twenty-four volume Encyclopedia Britannica was later delivered, 
Sotomayor described it as, "Christmas come early."54 Sonia greatly expanded her intellectual 
prowess and developed a thirst for knowledge as a result. 55 
Justice Sotomayor had been doing well in school; however she wanted to be one of the 
best in the class. 56 In order to accomplish this goal, Justice Sotomayor, in an atypical fashion for 
a fifth grader, decided to approach one of the smartest girls in her class and ask her how to 
48 Id at 47. 
49 ld at 69. 
50 ld 
51 ld at 70. 
52 ld 
53 Jd 
54 Jd 
55 I d at 70-71. 
56 ld . 
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study. 57 Through the ensuing conversation, Sotomayor learned to underline important facts and 
take notes while reading to condense information into smaller bits that were easy to remember, 
and to reread those notes before a test. 58 Justice Sotomayor stated that, the more important 
lesson she had learned through that exchange was, "Don't be shy about making a teacher of any 
willing party who knows what he or she is doing."59 Even at an early age, Justice Sotomayor 
was beginning to develop a pattern that would stick with her throughout the remainder of her 
education and her professional life: seeking out a mentor, asking guidance, and soaking up 
whatever information she could. 60 
B. Choosing a Career 
Justice Sotomayor's destiny to be a Supreme Court Justice further revealed itself at the 
astonishing age of ten. While sitting in the waiting room at Albert Einstein College of Medicine 
where she received tests for her diabetes, she read a pamphlet about choosing a profession suited 
for diabetics. 61 The pamphlet listed many possibilities: a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, an 
engineer, a nurse, and a teacher. 62 The pamphlet then contained a list of professions that were 
unsuited for a person with diabetes, and among this list was a police officer.63 This devastated 
Sotomayor, as she had aspirations of becoming a detective, just like those she read about in her 
Nancy Drew books. 64 
While contemplating that pamphlet, young Justice Sotomayor realized that her solution 
was available on the television series, Perry Mason. 65 Every Thursday night, Justice Sotomayor 
57 ld. at 72. 
58 ld. 
59 ld. 
60 Jd. 
61 ld. at 79. 
62 ld. 
63 ld. 
64 ld. 
65 ld. at 80. 
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sat, watching intently as Perry Mason solved his cases and proved his clients' innocence. 66 
While being enamored with Perry Mason, Justice Sotomayor's unwavering goal of finding the 
truth reared its head, as she was more sympathetic to Burger, the prosecutor.67 Burger was more 
committed to finding the truth than to winning his cases, and when Burger explained that if the 
defendant was truly innocent and the case was dismissed, he had done his job, because justice 
had been served. 68 With that being said however, it was the judge who truly captured 
Sotomayor's attention. 69 Justice Sotomayor knew that the end of the episode was the most 
important, because that was when the judge made his decision on whether or not to dismiss the 
charges.70 Ten year old Sonia Sotomayor, a girl whose decisiveness had already saved her 
family from confrontations and further fighting, knew she could be a great lawyer, and wanted to 
be ajudge. 71 
C. Justice Sotomayor's Education 
Once enrolled in Cardinal Spellman High School, Justice Sotomayor's intellectual 
horizons expanded with the influence of a history teacher, Miss Katz. Miss Katz taught Justice 
Sotomayor to think abstractly and conceptually, rather than just memorizing facts. 72 This skill 
was very important to Justice Sotomayor's development as an excellent student, and later, an 
excellent attorney and judge. Sonia learned how to analyze facts and how to think critically 
about history. 73 
Signing up for the Forensics Club at Cardinal Spellman also played an important role in 
Justice Sotomayor's development as an excellent examiner of facts. As evidence of Justice 
66 Id 
67 Id 
68 Id at 80-81. 
69 ld 
70 Id at 81. 
7t Id 
72 !d. at 104. 
73 Id 
11 
Sotomayor's ever persistent self-awareness, she joined the Forensics Club as part of her self-
imposed program in public speaking because the Forensics Club was a debate team.74 Justice 
Sotomayor's friend, Kenny Moy, was the student coach of the girl's team of the Forensics Club, 
and Justice Sotomayor learned from Kenny how to dismantle an opponent's position step by 
step, how to argue affirmatively and persuasively, and how to be unfazed by emotion. 75 Justice 
Sotomayor explained, "Forensics Club was good training for a lawyer in ways that I barely 
understood at the time. You got handed a topic, as well as the side you had to argue, pro or con. 
It didn't matter what you believed about the issue; what mattered was how well you argued. You 
not only had to see both sides; you had to prepare as if you were arguing both in order to 
anticipate your opponent's moves."76 
Justice Sotomayor had reached the finals of a speech competition, and her presentation 
offers insights to not only how well suited she was to be a lawyer and a judge, but also her view 
on crime and witnesses. 77 Justice Sotomayor selected the cold-blooded murder of Kitty 
Genovese in Queens, and the neighbors who witnessed it but did nothing as her topic for her 
final presentation.78 Justice Sotomayor ascended the podium and began to tell the story of Kitty 
Genovese; a young woman who drove home from her job as a bartender and was savagely 
stabbed, beaten, and raped.79 Justice Sotomayor, noticing the audiences undivided attention, 
continued; thirty-eight people in their homes witnessed the assault that lasted a half hour, 
however only one person called the police after it ended, when it was already too late.80 Justice 
Sotomayor explained that the assailant was later caught and is serving life in prison, but she was 
74 Id. at 109. 
75 I d. at 1 09-1 0. 
76 I d. at 11 0-11. 
77 Id. at 111. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 112. 
80 Id. 
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concerned with the witnesses, who sat idly by while this young woman was being raped and 
murdered.81 In her presentation, Justice Sotomayor explained,"' A crime like what happened to 
Kitty Genovese may be the act of a deranged individual. Other crimes may be different in their 
causes, pointing to broader failures of society. But in the moment of opportunity, when a 
criminal grabs his chance and a victim is suffering, our own responsibility is the same. When the 
criminal finds his victim in a dark alley, an observer too has a moment of opportunity. "'82 
Justice Sotomayor then challenged her audience, "'Will you see the victim not as a 
stranger or a statistic but as another human being like yourself? Will you be fully human in that 
moment and feel the obligation to care, to act, to get involved? Will you be fully a citizen and 
rise to the responsibility?"'83 This exchange offers invaluable insight into Justice Sotomayor's 
early capability to capture an audience, and to orate persuasively and argumentatively. 
Notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor's strong self-awareness and career aspirations, it took 
her friend Kenny Moy to begin her thinking about college. Kenny Moy, who was enrolled in his 
freshman year at Princeton University, called Sotomayor, and one statement Kenny made stuck 
with her because she had no idea what it meant: he said to try for the Ivy League. 84 Justice 
Sotomayor jotted down the names of the schools that Kenny rattled off, and when she informed 
her guidance counsellor at school of her aspirations, the guidance counsellor offered no help. 85 
Justice Sotomayor applied to the Ivy League schools that Kenny had recommended all on her 
own, and soon enough, a postcard from Princeton University arrived. 86 The post card contained 
three boxes, with "likely," "possible," and "unlikely," next to each.87 Justice Sotomayor's post 
81 ld 
82 Id at 113. 
83 ld 
84 Jd at 116-17. 
85 ld at 117. 
86 Id at 118. 
87 Id 
13 
card was marked "likely. "88 Justice Sotomayor, in a visit with a stunned guidance counsellor, 
had just learned that it was very likely she was going to be accepted to Princeton. 89 
An experience that would prove to be influential and motivational then happened to 
Justice Sotomayor: her first experience with affirmative action. As she was still trying to wrap 
her head around the prospect of being admitted to Princeton, the school nurse stopped Justice 
Sotomayor in the hallway.90 The school nurse wanted to know how Justice Sotomayor got a 
"likely" from Princeton, when two top ranking girls in the school only received a "possible."91 
Justice Sotomayor stated, "Her question would hang over me not just that day but for the next 
several years, while I lived the day-to-day reality of affirmative action."92 Justice Sotomayor did 
not understand affirmative action, as it was a mere decade old.93 However, the question that the 
nurse asked of her just pushed her to prove herself even more. After visiting Radcliffe, Yale, and 
Princeton, Justice Sotomayor decided to attend Princeton. 94 
While Justice Sotomayor ultimately thrived at Princeton, graduating summa cum laude, 
her determination and diligence proved itself after she received her first grade. Justice 
Sotomayor received a Con the first assignment she handed in at Princeton.95 Justice Sotomayor 
was crushed, and did not understand where she had gone wrong. 96 The Professor gave Justice 
Sotomayor all too familiar advice; her paper was full of information and facts, however, there 
was no argumentative structure, and no thesis that her facts were organized to support. 97 This 
was discouraging to Justice Sotomayor, and she did not know if she would ever master how to 
88 Jd. 
89 ld. 
90 ld. 
91 ld. at 119. 
92 ld. 
93 ld. 
94 Jd. at 123. 
95 ld. at 133. 
96 ld. 
97 ld. at 133-34. 
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write argumentatively, but, in another moment of indelible self-awareness, she realized that all 
she had to do was to transfer her debate skills onto paper.98 Justice Sotomayor realized that she 
needed to map out a position, anticipate and address objections, and consider how best to 
persuade her audience. 99 This simple realization is still present in the opinions she writes for the 
Supreme Court; efficiently and effectively organized into a well-mapped out argument, 
specifically tailored to addressing the weaknesses in her position. 
While the quality of her writing and her grades improved, Justice Sotomayor still had to 
solve her general deficiency in written English. 100 Justice Sotomayor's American History 
Professor pointed out that her sentences were fragments, her tenses were erratic, and her 
grammar was often incorrect. 101 Justice Sotomayor realized that this was, in part, due to the fact 
that she wrote English using Spanish constructions and usage. 102 Once again, evincing her work 
ethic, desire to be competitive, and her unending desire to better herself, Justice Sotomayor 
bought grammar and vocabulary handbooks, and during the summers would devote her lunch 
hour at work to doing grammar exercises and learning ten new words. 103 
Another challenge that Justice Sotomayor would overcome at Princeton was the self-
consciousness that came along with the gaps in knowledge and understanding as a result of the 
limits of class and cultural background. 104 Princeton was a drastic change to Justice Sotomayor's 
life, as she had been geographic and cultural experiences had been limited almost exclusively to 
the Bronx. 105 For the first time, Justice Sotomayor was also exposed to the wide disparity of 
wealth at Princeton. Justice Sotomayor's mother's income never reached above five thousand 
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dollars a year, and now, through her work study program, she was exposed to the financial 
figures of the wealthiest students at Princeton and how they paid for tuition. 106 Justice 
Sotomayor stated that after seeing those numbers she squarely knew where she stood in relation 
to some of the people among whom she was living and learning. 107 
Justice Sotomayor's persistence eventually paid off at Princeton, as she is the living 
epitome of the saying, "Hard work pays off." When Justice Sotomayor was a senior, she 
received a letter in the mail that she quickly disregarded and threw in the garbage. 108 The letter 
was from Phi Beta Kappa, a national honor society that Justice Sotomayor wrote off as a scam. 109 
It took a snooping friend of Justice Sotomayor's to convince her that it was a prestigious honor 
that she had to accept. 110 Another such occasion occurred when the dean of student affairs called 
Justice Sotomayor to inform her that she had won and would be receiving the Pyne Prize. 111 
Justice Sotomayor expressed her gratitude, but ultimately thought the dean of student affairs was 
overreacting in her congratulatory tone. 112 Justice Sotomayor called the same friend that had 
informed her of the prestige of Phi Beta Kappa, who explained to her that the award was the 
highest honor that a graduating senior at Princeton could receive, and obligated her to give a 
speech at an alumni luncheon. 113 
One last surprise would come for Justice Sotomayor at Princeton that she did not 
understand upon hearing the news. As Justice Sotomayor described, "Graduation brought one 
last unfamiliar laurel when Peter Winn called me into his office to tell me that I would graduate 
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summa cum laude."114 When Justice Sotomayor looked up the meaning of summa cum laude, 
not only was the irony not lost on her, however it was a moment of reflection. Justice Sotomayor 
stated, "It was perhaps then I made a measure of peace with my unease; the uncertainty I'd 
always felt at Princeton was something I'd never shake entirely. For all the As and honors that 
could be bestowed, there would still lurk such moments of estrangement to remind me that my 
being there was not typical but an exception."115 Justice Sotomayor's time at Princeton was 
finished, and she had more than proven herself as being worthy of its education. 
Justice Sotomayor enrolled in Yale Law School the fall after graduating from 
Princeton. 116 At Yale Law School, Justice Sotomayor would develop another mentor-mentee 
relationship that would profoundly influence her life. Notwithstanding the previous guiding 
forces in Justice Sotomayor's life, she described Jose Cabranes as her first true mentor. 117 
Justice Sotomayor described, "I had not yet discovered the benefit of sustained dialogue with 
someone who epitomized the kind of achievement I aspired to, and much beyond that. It was not 
the comfort ofhandholding; rather, it was a style of learning by means of engaging a living 
example."118 Justice Sotomayor learned from observing Jose Cabranes and the nuances and 
complexity of live action. 119 Justice Sotomayor described him as, "[T]he complete package of 
knowledge, experience, and judgment."120 
Justice Sotomayor worked for Jose Cabranes as his research assistant, researching the 
legislative history of U.S . citizenship for Puerto Ricans. 121 Sotomayor described she truly 
learned from observing Cabranes' behavior with people, and his knowledge of the law, history, 
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and his ability to warmly engage people in conversation. 122 Cabranes taught Justice Sotomayor 
many of the skills that would propel her to the Supreme Court. Sotomayor learned how to be a 
"citizen-lawyer," through maintaining community relationships while retaining self-assurance 
and grace. 123 Justice Sotomayor modeled her legal career after the example set by Jose 
Cabranes, and emphasized, "[A] role model in the flesh provides more than an inspiration; his or 
her very existence is confirmation of possibilities one may have every reason to doubt, saying, 
'Yes, someone like me can do this.' By the time I got to Yale, I had met a few successful 
lawyers, usually in their role as professors. Jose, the first I had the chance to observe up close, 
not only transcended the academic role but also managed to uphold his identity as a Puerto 
Rican, serving vigorously in both worlds."124 These lessons have persevered in Justice 
Sotomayor's career, and she has become. an exemplary model of how to become successful while 
staying true to one's roots. 
Another experience that would stick with Justice Sotomayor and impact her career was 
her summer associate position with the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. 125 
Justice Sotomayor struggled in this position, as she was assigned to contribute to a large brief 
being prepared for an antitrust case. 126 Justice Sotomayor stated that she knew her writing was 
subpar, but it was confirmed when her work was not included in what the associate she was 
working under prepared and passed on to the next level. 127 At the end of the summer, Justice 
Sotomayor was not offered a position with the firm, which shook Justice Sotomayor. 128 She was 
concerned that she was not yet thinking like a lawyer, and that the hard work she had put in was 
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not enough. 129 Once again, Justice Sotomayor viewed her writing as her weakness; an inability 
to persuasively advocate. 130 In pure Justice Sotomayor fashion however, she faced the challenge 
head on, and broke the problem up into smaller parts that were easier to tackle in a methodical 
fashion. 131 This same methodical analysis and her ability to break down a problem have stuck 
with her, and are evident in every judicial opinion, concurrence, or dissent that Justice 
Sotomayor pens. Justice Sotomayor, even though she eventually overcame this obstacle, stated, 
"The memory of this trauma, which I was determined not to repeat, while not suffocating my 
ambitions, would overhang my every career choice until I became ajudge."132 
Notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor's success at Princeton and at Yale Law School, 
people still doubted her and attributed her success to affirmative action. One such occasion that 
would stick with Justice Sotomayor was a dinner party hosted by the law firm Shaw, Pittman, 
Potts & Throwbridge. 133 Justice Sotomayor met the partner who held the event, and they 
immediately engaged in a discussion about affirmative action. 134 The partner asked Justice 
Sotomayor if she believed in affirmative action, and if Yale and Princeton had an affirmative 
action program. 135 He then asked Justice Sotomayor, '"Do you believe law firms should practice 
affirmative action? Don't you think it's a disservice to minorities, hiring them without the 
necessary credentials, knowing you'll have to fire them a few years later?"'136 Justice 
Sotomayor was taken aback by this question, and responded by stating that she thought even 
someone who got admitted by affirmative action could prove they were qualified by their 
subsequent accomplishments; to which the Partner from Shaw, Pittman responded that was the 
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problem with affirmative action, and proceeded to ask Justice Sotomayor if she thought she 
would have been admitted to Yale Law School if she was not Puerto Rican. 137 
Justice Sotomayor decided to go ahead with the formal recruiting process the following 
day, and had an interview with the partner from the night before. 138 Sotomayor went to the 
interview, and before she knew what was happening, the partner encouraged her to travel to 
Washington for the next step in the formal hiring process. 139 Justice Sotomayor, however, 
instead of accepting the invitation, challenged the partner on the preceding evening. 140 She 
confronted his insulting manner of speaking to her, and about his views of affirmative action. 141 
This is a great example of Justice Sotomayor's eagerness to stand up for herself and what she 
believes in, while doing so cordially and respectfully. 
As a result of this exchange, Justice Sotomayor came to a realization about affirmative 
action. She stated, "When the anger, the upset, and the agitation had passed, a certainty 
remained: I had no need to apologize that the look-wider, search-more affirmative action that 
Princeton and Yale practiced had opened doors for me. That was its purpose: to create the 
conditions whereby students from disadvantaged backgrounds could be brought to the starting 
line of a race many were unaware was even being run."142 Justice Sotomayor was starting to 
make peace with her affirmative action beginnings, and knew that she proved herself through her 
relentless hard work. 143 Affirmative action itself and its role in society has changed, but as 
Justice Sotomayor sta~ed, "But one thing has not changed: to doubt the worth of minority 
students' achievements when they succeed is really only to present another face of the prejudice 
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that would deny them a chance even to try. It is the same prejudice that insists all those destined 
for success must be cast from the same mold as those who have succeeded before them, a view 
that experience has already proven a fallacy." 144 Justice Sotomayor is a living example of that 
fallacy. 
One day at Yale, a desire for cheddar cheese cubes would dramatically affect Justice 
Sotomayor's career path. Justice Sotomayor, taking a break from studying one evening, passed 
the open door of a conference room where she observed a table of cheese, crackers, and cheap 
wine. 145 Inside the conference room was a panel on public service career paths. 146 The last 
speaker was a district attorney from New York who promised to be brief, so she decided to stay 
in order to reap the benefits of the cheese table. 147 When the district attorney began to speak, he 
immediately captured Justice Sotomayor's attention, as he stated that within the first year of 
employment with the district attorney, the new assistant's would be going to trial, with full 
responsibility for how they would develop and present their cases. 148 After the district attorney 
was done speaking, Justice Sotomayor lined up to speak to him, and their conversation led to a 
meeting the next day. 149 During this meeting, Justice Sotomayor was thoroughly impressed by 
what the district attorney was saying, and Perry Mason popped into her head. 150 Justice 
Sotomayor stated, "Perhaps Bob Morgenthau's job stirred a memory of what had first intrigued 
me about being a lawyer: the chance to seek justice in a courtroom. Despite my success in the 
trial advocacy program and reaching the semifinals of the Barrister's Union mock trials, Perry 
Mason was a vision that had been eclipsed at Yale amid the immersion in case law and theory 
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and self-doubt. Now, it seemed that untold fantasy was beckoning me again, conspiring with a 
bit of free cheddar to decide my fate." 151 Just like that, Justice Sotomayor accepted a position 
with the district attorney's office in New York, and began her climb to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
III. Opinions, Concurrences, and Dissents on the Supreme Court of the United States 
Justice Sotomayor has a distinctive style of legal writing. She employs a no-nonsense, 
common sense approach to legal writing in which she engages in broad research of the relevant 
law, precedent, statutory history, and factual details in order to reach a narrow conclusion. 
Utilizing the same techniques she developed at an early age, Justice Sotomayor breaks down the 
issue into smaller problems and methodically works her way through it to reach a well thought 
out conclusion, applying the law to the facts in a narrow, yet commonsense fashion. Justice 
Sotomayor's legal opinions all follow a similar overall structure: a thorough analysis of the facts 
of the case, a description of the case's procedural posture, an in-depth and technical explanation 
of the current law, an acknowledgment of the opposition's stance, an often narrow, 
commonsense application of the law to the facts, and a conclusion. The following cases were 
selected as they are excellent examples of Justice Sotomayor's technical, incremental, and 
exhaustive application of the law to the facts in front of her. 
A. Majority Opinions 
1. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) 
This case, exemplifies Justice Sotomayor's commonsense approach to the application of 
law to the specific facts presented to her. The issue in this case is whether or not the age of a 
child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis identified in Miranda v. 
151 ld. 
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Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 152 Justice Sotomayor, in writing for the majority, held that, so 
long as the child's age was known to the police officer at the time of police questioning, or 
would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody 
analysis is proper. 153 
J.D.B. was a thirteen year old, seventh grade student attending class at Smith Middle 
School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina when he was removed from class by a uniformed police 
officer, taken to a conference room, and questioned. 154 J.D.B was being questioned because he 
was seen behind a residence in a neighborhood where two home break-ins had occurred, and he 
was seen at school possessing a digital camera that was stolen from one of those homes. 155 A 
police investigator, Investigator DiCostanzo, was assigned to the case and went to J.D.B.'s 
school to question him. 156 Investigator DiCostanzo instructed the school resource officer to 
remove J.D.B. from class and to take him to a conference room. 157 J.D.B. was then questioned 
by Investigator DiCostanzo in the presence of the school resource officer, the assistant principal, 
and the administrative intern about the home break-ins, without ever receiving Miranda 
warnings, without being given a chance to speak with his legal guardian (his grandmother), and 
without being informed that he could terminate the questioning and leave at any time. 158 
Upon questioning, J.D.B. originally denied any wrongdoing, stating that he was in the 
neighborhood seeking work mowing lawns. 159 The assistant principal then urged J.D.B. to "do 
the right thing," because, "the truth always comes out in the end."160 Eventually, J.D.B. asked 
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Investigator DiCostanzo if he would "still be in trouble" if he returned the "stuff."161 
Investigator DiCostanzo then explained to J.D.B. that the return of the stolen goods would bode 
well for J.D.B., however, the case was going to be litigated regardless. 162 DiCostanzo then 
warned J.D.B. that he may have to go to juvenile detention before court if DiCostanzo believed 
that J.D.B would continue to break into other homes. 163 After learning this information, J.D.B. 
confessed to the home break-ins and only then was J.D.B. told that he could refuse to answer the 
Investigator's answers, and that he was free to leave. 164 J.D.B. then wrote a statement, and at the 
end of the school day he was allowed to get on the bus and go home. 165 
J.D.B. was charged with two counts of breaking and entering and larceny in the juvenile 
petitions filed against him. 166 The public defender moved to suppress the statements J.D.B. had 
made to Investigator DiCostanzo, arguing that J.D.B. had been interrogated by police in a 
custodial setting without being read his Miranda rights. 167 The trial court denied the motion, 
determining that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that his 
statements were voluntary. 168 J.D.B. appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed, holding that J.D.B. was not in custody when he confessed and declining to consider the 
age of the individual subjected to questioning by police. 169 
Justice Sotomayor then began her incremental, methodical breakdown of the relevant law 
and precedent to which she would make her decision. Justice Sotomayor stated, "Any police 
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interview of an individual suspected of a crime has 'coercive aspects to it. "'170 Justice 
Sotomayor noted, however, that only police interrogations that occur in custody present the 
heightened risk that the statements obtained from a suspect are not the product of free will. 171 
Justice Sotomayor pointed out that custodial interrogation entails inherently compelling 
pressures, and that even for an adult, the physical and psychological isolation of custodial 
interrogation can undermine the individual's will to resist and compel speech where he or she 
would not do so otherwise. 172 As a result of custodial interrogation by police, many people 
confess to crimes they did not commit, and Justice Sotomayor explained that this risk is all the 
more present and troubling when the subject of custodial interrogation is a child. 173 
The Court then explained that, in response to this inherently coercive environment, it 
adopted Miranda in order to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 174 
As a result, prior to questioning, a suspect must be informed that he or she has the right to remain 
silent, that any statement he or she does make may be used against him or her in a court of law, 
and that he or she has the right to an attorney, whether retained or appointed. 175 Miranda further 
placed the burden on the government to establish that, if a suspect does make a statement, he or 
she did so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 176 
Justice Sotomayor then described the necessity of determining whether the suspect was in 
custody in order to determine if he or she was entitled to his or her Miranda rights. She stated, 
"Because these measures protect the individual against the coercive nature of custodial 
interrogation, they are required 'only where there had been such a restriction on a person's 
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freedom as to render him in custody."' 177 Justice Sotomayor then stated the test for determining 
whether a suspect is in custody is twofold: what were the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, and given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was 
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. 178 The objective nature of the test means that 
the subjective views of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned are irrelevant in 
the custody analysis. 179 The objective nature of the inquiry is meant to give police clear 
guidance as to when Miranda warning are required. 180 Because police need to make split second 
decisions regarding whether or not to read a suspect his or her Miranda rights, limiting the 
analysis to the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person 
in the suspect's position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave, the 
objective test avoids burdening police with the task of making a subjective state of mind inquiry 
with every suspect. 181 
~otomayor then begari to apply Miranda and its progeny regarding the custody 
~ ... ..-~~ 
analysis to J.D.B.'s situation. Justice Sotomayor began by stating: 
The state and amici contend that a child's age has no place in the 
custody analysis no matter how young the child subjected to police 
questioning. We cannot agree. In some circumstances, a child's 
age 'would have affected how a reasonable person' in the suspect's 
position 'would perceive his or her freedom to leave. That is, a 
reasonable child subject to police questioning will sometimes feel 
pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to 
go.I82 
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the Court believed that courts can account for the reality that 
children think, act, and are influenced differently than adults, without damaging the objective 
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nature of the custody analysis. 183 Justice Sotomayor then pointed to the commonsense notion 
that a child's age is more than a chronological fact: it is a fact that generates commonsense 
conclusions about behavior and perception. 184 Justice Sotomayor continued, "Such conclusions 
apply broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a child once 
himself, including any police officer or judge."185 
Justice Sotomayor then pointed to the court's own history to demonstrate her point that 
the law treats children differently. She stated that the Court has observed that children are less 
mature and responsible than adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, and that they are 
more vulnerable to outside pressures than adults. 186 Justice Sotomayor further pointed out that 
the Court, in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948), stated that events that would leave a man 
in police interrogation cold and unimpressed could overcome, overawe, and overwhelm a 
child. 187 
Justice Sotomayor then pointed out that a multitude of other areas of the law recognize 
children's' limited capacity to make decisions and understand the world around them. 188 She 
described how the universal differentiating characteristics of children are universal, pointing to 
the limitations on children's ability to alienate property, enter a binding contract, and marry 
without parent consent. 189 More Strikingly, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that, "[E]ven where a 
'reasonable person' standard otherwise applies, the common law has reflect the reality that 
....... ~
children are not adults. In negligence suits, for instances, where liability turns on what an 
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objectively reasonable person would do in the circumstances, '[a]ll American jurisdictions accept 
the idea that a person's childhood is a relevant circumstance' to be considered."190 Accordingly, 
recognizing that there is an abundance of legal precedent that does not treat children as miniature 
adults, Justice Sotomayor announced her standard, "So long as the child's age was known to the 
officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable 
officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider 
circumstances unknown to them, nor to anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies of the particular 
suspect whom they question."191 
Justice Sotomayor's application of the law governing Miranda's custody determination 
of children is commonsense, because childhood and age yields objective conclusions similar to 
those identified in this opinion, and considering age in the custody analysis does not involve a 
determination of how a child's age subjectively affects the mindset of a particular child. 192 
Justice Sotomayor provided that this case was a prime example of how an application of the 
custody analysis without considering age as a factor would lead to absurd results. Justice 
Sotomayor stated: 
Were the court precluded from taking J.D.B. 's youth into account, 
it would be forced to evaluate the circumstances present here 
through the eyes of a reasonable person of average years. In other 
words, how would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after 
being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a 
uniformed school resource officer; being encouraged by his 
assistant principal to 'do the right thing'; and being warned by a 
police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention and 
separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? To describe 
such an inquiry is to demonstrate its absurdity. Neither officers 
nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of objective 
circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without 
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accounting for the age of the child subjected to those 
circumstances.193 
As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, deciding whether a child's age influenced whether or not he 
or she felt free to terminate an interrogation and leave does not involve a detailed subjective 
inquiry into each child's state ofmind. 194 Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor held that so long as 
the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been 
objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent 
with the objective nature of that test. 195 
This case demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's commonsense approach to the application of 
law to a specific set of facts. While some of her colleagues dissented, believing that the Court's 
decision cannot be reconciled with Miranda 's attempt at establishing a clear rule that can be 
applied in all cases, this case is a demonstration that strict adherence to a precedent can lead to 
absurd results, if not for the application of commonsense. Justice Sotomayor, in determining that 
it is proper to account for a child's age in Miranda's objective custody test, applied 
commonsense to existing precedent in order to reach a logical, well-rounded conclusion. 
2. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010) 
This case presented the Court with the question of whether its decision in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by 
Congress as advisory, requires reading the Sentencing Guidelines as nonbinding. 196 Justice 
Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held that, given the limited scope and purpose of the statute 
at issue, the proceedings at issue under that section do not implicate the interests identified in 
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Booker, and that the sentencing modification proceedings authorized by the statute are not 
constitutionally compelled. 197 
In 1993, Percy Dillon was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and to possess 
with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of powder cocaine and more than 50 grams of 
crack cocaine in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with the intent to distribute more than 
500 grams of powder cocaine in violation of§ 841(a)(1), and use of a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking offense. 198 These convictions exposed Dillon to ten years to life 
imprisonment for the conspiracy charges, five to forty years imprisonment for the cocaine 
possession, and a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for the firearm offense to be served 
consecutively to the sentence for the drug offenses. 199 
While being sentenced, the District Court found that Dillon was responsible 1.5 
kilograms of crack cocaine and 1.6 kilograms of powder cocaine.200 These offenses, coupled 
with other agitating and mitigating factors exposed Dillon to a mandatory sentence range of two 
hundred sixty two to three hundred twenty seven months imprisonment.201 The Court sentenced 
Dillon at the bottom of the Guidelines range, followed by a mandatory sixty month sentence for 
the firearm count, for a total sentence of three hundred twenty two months?02 At sentencing, the 
District Court explained that it viewed the length of the term to be entirely too high for the crime 
committed, but was constrained to impose the sentence the Guidelines set out. 203 The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Dillon's conviction and sentence on appeal. 204 
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Justice Sotomayor began her majority opinion describing the statutory history of the 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c), the statute at issue in this case. Justice Sotomayor stated that, under§ 3582(c), 
a federal court generally may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. 205 
However, Congress enacted§ 3582(c)(2), which states that, in the case of a defendant who has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, a court may reduce the sentence if it is consistent 
with applicable Commission policy statements.206 The policy statement that proceeds § 
3582( c )(2) instructs courts not to reduce a term of imprisonment below the minimum number of 
an amended sentencing range except to the extent the original term of imprisonment was below 
the range then acceptable.207 
Justice Sotomayor explained that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the 
Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines and to issue 
(----· ~-. 
po~~-e ~tJtements regarding the Guidelines' application.208 Under the Act, the Commission must 
periodically review and revise the Guidelines and determine under what circumstances and by 
what amount the sentences for certain offenses can be reduced?09 Justice Sotomayor stated that, 
as enacted, the Act made the Sentencing Guidelines binding, and that except in limited 
circumstances, district courts lacked discretion to depart from the Guidelines.210 Justice 
Sotomayor stated, "Under that regime, facts found by a judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence often increased the mandatory Guidelines ran~d permitted the judge to impose a 
sentence greater than that supported by the facts established by the jury verdict or guilty plea. 
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We held in Booker that treating the Guidelines as mandatory in these circumstances violated the 
Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury and to have every element of 
an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt."211 
In order to remedy that constitutional problem, the Court rendered the Guidelines 
advisory by invalidating two provisions of the Act: § 3553(b)(1), which required a sentencing 
court to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, and§ 3742(e), which 
prescribed the standard of review on appeal, including de novo review of Guidelines 
departures.212 The Court concluded that, with those two sections excised, the rest of the Act 
satisfied the constitution. Justice Sotomayor then stated that Booker thus left intact other 
provisions of the Act, including those giving the Commission authority to revise the Guidelines 
and to determine when and to what extent a revision would be retroactive?13 
The Sentencing Guidelines, with respect to drug trafficking offenses, establish a 
defendant's base offense level by the type and weight of the drug.214 The Sentencing 
Commission amended the Guidelines in 2007 to reduce by two levels the base offense level 
associated with each quantity of crack cocaine, and in 2008 the Commission made the revision 
retroactive. 215 According to the Act, when the Commission makes a Guidelines amendment 
retroactive,§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence that is 
based on the amended provision, and any reduction must be consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.216 The relevant policy statement to drug 
trafficking offenses is USSG § 1B 1.1 0, which instructs courts proceeding under § 3582( c )(2) to 
211 !d. at 2687-688. 
212 !d. at 2688. 
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substitute the amended Guidelines range while leaving intact all other Guidelines application 
decisions.217 Justice Sotomayor then stated, that, "Under§ 3582(c)(2), a court may then grant a 
reduction within the amended Guidelines range if it determines that one is warranted 'after 
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable.' Except in 
limited circumstances, however,§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) forecloses a court acting under§ 3582(c)(2) 
from reducing a sentence 'to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guidelines 
ranges. "'218 
Percy Dillon filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3 5 82( c )(2) after 
learning that the Sentencing Commission made an amendment to the crack cocaine Guidelines 
retroactive.219 Dillon asked the District Court to reduce his sentence further than the two level 
reduction authorized by the amendment. 220 Dillon argued that the Court should reduce his 
sentence pursuant to the sentencing factors found in§ 3553(a), specifically based on his post-
conviction pursuit of educational and community outreach opportunities.221 Such factors, Dillon 
argued, justified the Court in varying from the Guidelines?22 Dillon further argued that the 
Court's decision in Booker authorized courts to grant such a variance because the amended 
Guidelines range was advisory, notwithstanding any contrary statement § 1 B 1.1 0 in the 
Commission's policy statements. 
The District Court reduced Dillon's sentence to two hundred seventy months, but 
declined to go further, concluding that Booker was not binding and accordingly holding that it 
lacked authority to impose a sentence inconsistent with § 1 B 1.1 0' s two level reduction. 223 The 
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Third Circuit affirmed the District Court, stating that§ 3582(c)(2) is codified in a different 
section than the provisions invalidated in Booker and contains no cross-reference to those 
provisions.224 The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court was correct in holding it 
lacked authority to reduce Dillon's sentence below the amended Guidelines range, stating 
Booker did not obviate Congress' directive in§ 3582(c)(2) that a sentence reduction should be 
consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements.225 
Dillon argued that Booker should preclude the Commission from issuing a policy 
statement that generally forecloses below Guidelines sentences at§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings, 
which§ lBl.lO does.226 Dillon thus argued that the mandatory language in the Commission's 
policy statement in§ 1Bl.lO(b)(2)(A) should be excised, and treated as advisory, just as the 
provisions deemed unconstitutional in Booker. 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, stated that the language of§ 3582(c)(2) 
foreclosed Dillon's argument, because it speaks of sentence modification by giving courts the 
power to reduce an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission, and 
not a sentencing or resentencing proceeding like the one outlawed in Booker.227 Justice 
Sotomayor pointed out that, "It is also notable that the provision applies only to a limited class of 
prisoners- namely those whose sentence was based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered 
by the Commission. Section 3582(c)(2)'s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that 
Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a 
224 ld at 2690. 
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plenary resentencing proceeding. "228 As a result, the sentence modification for crack cocaine 
offenses did not implicate defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. 
Justice Sotomayor also stated that the substantial role that Congress gave the Commission 
in sentence modification proceedings further supports that conclusion. 229 The Act gives the 
Commission the authority to decide whether to amend the Guidelines and to decide whether to 
make the amendments retroactive.230 Accordingly, a court's power under§ 3582(c)(2) depends 
on the Commission's decision not just to amend the Guidelines but to make the amendment 
retroactive.231 Courts are further constrained by the Commission's policy statements dictating by 
what amount the sentence affected by the amendment may be reduced.232 Further,§ 3582(c)(2) 
instructs a district court to consider the sentencing factors set out in§ 3553(a) only to the extent 
applicable, but it authorizes a reduction only on the basis that the reduction is consistent with the 
applicable policy statements issued by the Commission, which, in this case is§ 1Bl.10?33 
Accordingly, a court must first determine that a reduction is consistent with § 1 B 1.10 before it 
can consider whether a sentence reduction is warranted according to the factors set out in § 
3553(a).234 As a result, a district court does not have the authority to issue a new sentence in the 
usual sense, but only a sentence modification consistent with the Commission's instructions set 
out in§ 1B1.10.235 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires a defendant be present at sentencing, but excludes from that 
228 I d. at 2691. 
229 !d. 
230 Jd 
231 !d. 
232 !d. 
233 !d. 
234 !d. 
235 !d. 
35 
requirement proceedings that involve the correction or reduction of a sentence under Rule 35 or 
18 U.S.C. 3582(c)?36 
As a result of the foregoing, Justice Sotomayor found that proceedings under § 
3582(c)(2) do not implicate the interests identified in Booker?37 Justice Sotomayor pointed out 
that the sentence modification proceedings at issue are not constitutionally compelled, and that 
the Court is not aware of any constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants 
to the benefit of subsequent Guidelines amendments?38 As a result, Justice Sotomayor 
concluded that§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings do~}Jplicate a defendants Sixth Amendment right to 
have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 239 Any facts found by a judge at 
a§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding do not serve to increase the prescribed range of punishment, but only 
affect the judge's exercise in discretion in reducing the original sentence within the Guidelines 
range.240 As a result, there is no encroachment by judges upon facts historically found by the 
jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain at trial.241 
This case exemplifies that Justice Sotomayor does not decide her cases on ideological 
grounds. The stereotypical liberal judge tends to side with criminal defendant's rights, and are 
more sympathetic to their position. Here, however, Justice Sotomayor evinces her dedication to 
the application of the law, and is not influenced by any perceived unfairness to the defendant. 
This opinion also sheds light on Justice Sotomayor's interpretation of legislative history and 
precedent. Her opinion works methodically through the legislative history of the Sentencing 
Reform Act, beginning with its adoption, and working her way to the current state of the law. 
236 Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4). 
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Justice Sotomayor then applies the language of the statute in light of its history and relevant case 
law to come to a narrow, competent application of the law to the facts. This is a reflection of 
Justice Sotomayor's dedication to the legal profession and her devotion to finding the truth. 
3. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) 
In this case, Richard Bryant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder when the 
trial court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who 
discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot.242 The Michigan Supreme Court 
held on appeal that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 57 U.S. 813 (2006), made 
Covington's statements inadmissible testimonial hearsay, reversing Bryant's conviction.243 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the Confrontation Clause barred 
Covington's statements admission at trial.244 Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held 
that Covington's statements were admissible because the primary purpose of the police's 
questioning of Covington was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 245 As a 
result, the Court held that Covington's statements regarding the identification and location of the 
shooting were not testimonial, and their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause?46 
Anthony Covington was found by the police lying on the ground at a Detroit gas station 
at 3:25 a.m. with a gunshot wound to his abdomen?47 Upon finding Covington, the police asked 
him what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting occurred. 248 Covington 
242 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). 
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stated that someone named "Rick" shot him about twenty minutes earlier, and that he had a 
conversation with Bryant through the back door of Bryant's house, and when he turned to leave, 
he was shot through the back door and then drove to the gas station?49 The police's conversation 
with Covingto~~4~ted between five and ten minutes, when emergency medical 
services arrived. 25° Covington was then transported to a nearby hospital where he died several 
hours later.251 The police traveled to Bryant's residence, where they found blood, a bullet, a 
bullet hole in the back door, and Covington's wallet and identifying information.252 
At trial, Bryant was convicted of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 253 Bryant appealed his 
conviction up to the Michigan Supreme Court, arguing that Covington's statements to the police 
were testimonial, and thus should not have been admitted at trial in contravention of his 
Confrontation Clause rights?54 The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the 
primary purpose of the police's interrogation of Covington was to establish the facts of an event 
that had already occurred, and thus were not to enable the police to meet an ongoing 
emergency. 255 
Justice Sotomayor began by stating, "The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
states: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.' The Fourteenth Amendment renders the Confrontation Clause binding 
on the States. "256 The Court, in Crawford, examined the history of the Confrontation Clause and 
determined that the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was meant to eradicate was /\ 
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using ex parte communications as evidence against the accused. 257 The Court in that case 
limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial statements and held that in order for 
testimonial evidence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment demands unavailability of the 
witness and a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her.258 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor 
explained that, at a minimum, Crawford defined testimonial statements as those given during 
preliminary hearings, before a grand jury, at a former trial, and police interrogations.259 
The Court, in Davis in 2006, elaborated that, "' [I]nterrogation by law enforcement officer 
fi~-~uarely within the class' of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind interrogations 
solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence 
to convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing 
signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating 
officer, is testimonial. "'260 Justice Sotomayor then explained that the Court in Davis, thus made 
clear that not all those questioned by the police are witnesses and not all interrogations by police 
are subject to the Confrontation Clause.Z61 Justice Sotomayor elaborated that, in Davis, the court 
explained, '"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.' "262 Thus, the Confrontation Clause restricts the introduction of out of 
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court statements where state actors are involved in a formal, out of court interrogation of a 
witness to obtain evidence for trial.263 
Justice Sotomayor then explained that in order to determine whether the primary purpose 
of an interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, the Court 
objectively evaluates the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and 
actions of the parties.264 Justice Sotomayor then elaborated: 
As we suggested in Davis, when a court must determine whether 
the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a statement at trial, 
it should determine the "primary purpose of the interrogation" by 
objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to 
the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the 
interrogation occurs. The existence of an emergency or the 
parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the 
most important circumstances that courts must take into account in 
determining whether an interrogation is testimonial because 
statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing 
emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would 
subject them to the requirement of confrontation. As the context of 
this case brings into sharp relief, the existence and duration of an 
emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the 
. . h 1" d h bl" 265 vtctlm, t e po 1ce, an t e pu 1c. 
Justice Sotomayor stated that in this case, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 
pointed to the occurrence of an ongoing threat because Covington, ~he police, knew the 
whereabouts of the shooter.266 Justice Sotomayor stated, "At bottom, there was an ongoing 
emergency here where an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting were 
unknown, had mortally wounded Covington within a few blocks and a few minutes of the 
location where the police found Covington. "267 
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Justice Sotomayor then described that the mere existence of an ongoing emergency was 
not enough to establish whether Covington's statements were testimonial, but the ultimate 
inquiry is whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to 
meet the ongoing emergency.268 When the police arrived at the gas station and began 
questioning Covington, he was lying on the ground, mortally wounded from a gunshot that 
struck him in the abdomen, causing him great pain and limiting his ability to speak. 269 
According to the police officers, Covington's statements were often punctuated with questions 
about when emergency medical services would arrive.270 Justice Sotomayor concluded that, 
from the description of his condition and report of his statements, a person in Covington's 
situation would not have a primary purpose to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
1 . . 1 . 271 to ater cnm1na prosecution. 
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor reiterated that the police responded to a call that a man was 
shot, without knowing why, where, or when the shooting occurred: neither were the police aware 
of the location of the shooter nor anything else regarding the circumstances in which the crime 
occurred.272 Justice Sotomayor, in concluding that the police's primary purpose was not to 
establish incriminating evidence for later use at trial, stated that their questiong the kind 
necessary to allow them to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and the possible 
danger to the victim and the public. As a result, Justice Sotomayor determined that these 
circumstances pointed to the primary purpose of assessing and assisting in an ongoing 
emergency. 
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor considered the informal setting in which the interrogation took 
place.273 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the informality of the situation suggests that the 
police officer's primary purpose was simply to address what they perceived to be an ongoing 
emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formality that would have alerted Covington to or 
focused his attention on the possible future prosecution ofBryant.274 Justice Sotomayor then 
concluded that, because the circumstances of the encounter objectively indicate that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to an ongoing emergency, 
Covington's statements regarding the identification of Bryant and the location of the shooting 
were not testimonial, and the Confrontation Clause did not bar their admittance at trial. 275 
This opinion effectively demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's ability to reconcile 
complicated facts with precedent in order to reach a no-nonsense, commonsense conclusion. 
Here, Covington was bleeding out in the parking lot of a gas station, and when the police arrived, 
there was no indication of the location of Bryant and whether or not he posed a continuing threat 
to Covington, the police, and the public. Justice Sotomayor relied on her instincts, diligent legal 
research, and the fluidity of the situation in order to determine that Covington's statements were 
not made in comprehension of future litigation. Furthermore, this opinion evinces the notion that 
Justice Sotomayor decides cases not by her ideological standpoint, but by coming to a 
commonsense conclusion in light of the facts of each case presented to her. 
4. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) 
~. r(; 
This case presents the issue of whether or not a defendant t.j a patent infringement claim 
is required to prove the patent's invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.276 Respondents i4i 
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Limited Partnership hold a patent for an improved method for editing computer documents, 
which stores a document's content separately from the metacodes associated with the 
document's structure.277 i4i sued Microsoft for infringement of this patent, claiming that 
Microsoft used their patent in its Microsoft Word program. 278 Microsoft denied infringement 
and counterclaimed, stating that i4i's patent was invalid and unenforceable.279 Microsoft 
claimed that i4i's patent was bJ~ .by § 102(b) of the Patent Act, which forbids issuing a patent 
for an invention that was previously on sale. 280 A jury found that Microsoft had willingly 
infringed i4i's patent and that Microsoft failed to prove the patent's invalidity.281 The District 
Court denied Microsoft's motion for post-judgment relief?82 The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a patent 
invalidity defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 283 
Justice Sotomayor explained that, pursuant to its authority under the Patent Clause of the 
constitution, Congress charged the United States Patent and Trademark Office with examining 
patent applications and issuing patents if it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under 
the law.284 To receive patent protection, a claimed invention must be patentable subject matter, 
novel, and nonobvious.285 There are statutory bars to patent approval under§ 102(b): the 
relevant bar in this case precludes patent protection for any invention that was on sale in this 
country more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application. 286 If issued, a patent grants 
its holder exclusive use of the patent for a period of 20 years from the filing date of the 
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application. 287 In order to enforce that right, the patent holder can bring an infringement action 
against one who, without permission, makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the patented 
invention.288 The alleged infringer may assert under§ 282 of the Patent Act that the patent is 
invalid and should have not been issued.289 Under § 282, the patent is presumed to be valid and 
imposes the burden of proving its invalidity on the attacker?90 
The dispute in this case arose out of Microsoft's contention that i4i's invention was on 
sale more than a year earlier in the United States.291 The District Court instructed the jury that 
Microsoft must have proved i4i's patent invalid by clear and convincing evidence?92 
Microsoft's post-judgment motion argued that it only had to prove invalidity by a preponderance 
of the evidence.293 Justice Sotomayor began her analysis by stating that, "Where Congress has 
prescribed the governing standard of proof, its choice controls absent countervailing 
constitutional constraints. The question, then, is whether Congress has made such a choice 
here."294 
Justice Sotomayor held that Congress had made such a choice, by finding that, in 
adopting § 282 of the Patent Act, Congress adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard 
by codifying the common law meaning of"presumed valid."295 Justice Sotomayor reached this 
conclusion by a methodical analysis of the Patent Act and the common law meaning associated 
with the presumption of validity. Justice Sotomayor asserted that, by§ 282's express terms, it 
establishes a presumption of patent validity, and it provides that a challenger must overcome that 
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presumption to prevail on an invalidity defense. 296 The problem is that the statute does not 
expressly articulate the standard ofproof.297 Justice Sotomayor then stated, "We begin, of 
course, with the assumption that the ordinary meaning of the language chosen by Congress 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose. But where Congress uses a common-law term in a 
statute, we assume the term ... comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing 
another way."298 Justice Sotomayor then emphasized that Congress, by stating that a patent is 
presumed valid, used a term with a settled meaning in common law?99 
Justice Sotomayor found that the common law recognized that in patent law, there is a 
presumption of validity which is not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence, and 
that an infringer attacking the validity of a patent bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails 
unless its evidence has more than a dubious preponderance.300 As a result, Justice Sotomayor 
found that the common law recognized that a preponderance of the evidence was too light of a 
I 
;?~ 
standard ofpro~fdeem a patent invalid.301 Thus, by the time Congress enacted§ 282, the 
1 
presumption of patent validity had an established meaning in the common law, notably requiring 
clear and convincing evidence to overcome.302 Justice Sotomayor concluded, that, "Under the 
general rule that a common law term comes with its common law meaning, we cannot conclude 
that Congress intended to drop the heightened standard proof from the presumption simply 
because§ 282 fails to reiterate it expressly."303 Justice Sotomayor continued, "On the contrary, 
we must presume that Congress intended to incorporate the heightened standard of proof, unless 
296 !d. at 2245. 
297 Jd. 
298 !d. 
299 !d. 
300 Jd., (citing RCA v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)). 
301 !d. at 2246. 
302 !d. 
303 ld. 
45 
the statute otherwise dictates."304 Finding that Congress did not otherwise dictate a different 
standard of proof in § 282, it codified the common law presumption of patent validity, and the 
heightened standard of proof attached to it. 305 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that an 
alleged infringer seeking to prove a patent's invalidity must do so by clear and convincing 
evidence. 306 
This decision enforces Justice Sotomayor's dedication to the law, and her belief that 
judge's apply the law, and do not make it. This is supported by the fact that Justice Sotomayor 
rejected Microsoft's contention that a lower standard of proof was warranted when an attacker 
presents evidence that was not considered by the PTO. Justice Sotomayor found no evidentiary 
or common law policy supporting that contention, and declined to adopt such a rule that had no 
basis in the law. This decision also evinces Justice Sotomayor's ability to utilize all of the 
statutory interpretation resources that are in the "toolbox" she referenced in her interview with 60 
Minutes. Justice Sotomayor utilizes any relevant statutory or common law history that will help 
her determine the ultimate truth of the matter. 
5. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010) 
In this case, the Supreme Court determined that ~ule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
jJ#J 
Procedure, which governs when a claim that has pa~ the statute of limitations relates back to the 
timely filing of a previous complaint, depends on what the party to be added to the suit knew or 
should have known, not on the amending party's knowledge or timeliness in seeking to amend 
the pleading. 307 
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Wanda Krupski was injured on February 21, 2007, when she tripped over a cable and 
fractured her femur on board a cruise ship owned by Costa Croci ere. 308 Krupski retained an 
attorney and began a personal injury suit upon returning home, using her admission ticket as the :_ "'0v-
~y > 
309 6~ ' ' ~ 
sole contract between her and the Costa Crociere. The ticket stated that Costa Crociere was an v~~/./····' 
Italian corporation that owned all of the vessels and other ships owned and operated by Costa 
Crociere.310 The ticket further provided that an injured party submit written notice of their claim 
to the carrier or its duly authorized agent within 185 days after the injury and required any 
lawsuit to be filed within one year after the date of the injury and to be served upon the carrier 
within 120 days offiling.311 The ticket further extended the defenses, limitations, and exceptions 
that may be invoked by the carrier to all persons and organizations who may act on behalf of the 
carrier, including Costa Cruise Lines, the carrier's sales and marketing agent.312 The ticket also 
listed Costa Cruise Lines' Florida address and stated than an entity called Costa Cruises was the 
first cruise company in the world to obtain a certain certification of quality.313 
Krupski's attorney notified Costa Cruise Lines of Krupski's claims, and Costa Cruise 
Lines' claims administrator requested additional information in order to facilitate settlement 
discussions.314 Settlement discussions broke down, and Krupski filed a negligence suit against 
Costa Cruise Lines three weeks before the one year limitations period ended in the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District ofFlorida.315 Krupski alleged that Costa Cruise owned, 
operated, managed, supervised and controlled the ship on which Krupski was injured, that Costa 
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Cruise owed a duty to its passengers, which was subsequently breached by its failure to take 
h . . 316 steps to prevent er InJury. 
After the limitations period had expired, Costa Cruise brought the existence of Costa 
Croci ere to Krupski's attention on three occasions, and on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise moved for 
summary judgment, stating that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant.317 Krupski responded 
by arguing for limited discovery to determine whether Costa Cruise should be dismissed.318 
According to Krupski, she believed Costa Cruise Lines to be the proper party to file a claim 
against because the travel documents prominently identified and displayed Costa Cruise Lines 
and its address, Costa Cruise's website listed its address as the United States office for the Italian 
company Costa Croci ere, and the Florida Department of State listed Costa Cruise as the only 
"Costa" company registered to do business in that state.319 Krupski also relied on the fact that 
Costa Cruise's claims administrator responded to her without indicating that it was not a 
responsible party.320 With her response, Krupski moved to amend her complaint to add Costa 
Crociere as a defendant.321 The District Court then denied Costa Cruise's motion for summary 
v r:1 
judgment and granted Krupski's motion for leave to amend her claim, and ordered Krupsk!fffect 
service on Costa Croci ere. 322 
Krupski filed an amended claim on July 11, 2008, and served Costa Croci ere on August 
21, 2008.323 Costa Crociere, represented by the same counsel that represented Costa Cruise, 
moved to dismiss the complaint against it, arguing that the claim did not relate back under 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c), and was therefore untimely.324 The District Court 
agreed. 325 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, stating that 
because Krupski's admissions ticket identified the proper party to be sued, Krupski knew or 
should have known of Costa Croci ere's identity as a proper party. 326 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held that the District Court and the Eleventh 
Circuit's dismissal of the claim was improper, as the question under Rule 15(c)(l)(C)(ii) is not 
whether Krupski knew or should have known the identity of Costa Croci ere as the proper 
defendant, but whether Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been 
named as a defendant but for an error. Justice Sotomayor reached this conclusion by stating that 
information in the plaintiff's possession is relevant only if it bears on the defendant's 
understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party's identity. 327 
Justice Sotomayor continued to state that the reasonableness of the mistake is not itself an 
issue.328 Justice Sotomayor explained that, "A prospective defendant who legitimately believed 
that the limitations period had passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong interest in 
repose. But repose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant who understood, or who 
should have understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period only because the 
plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity. Because a plaintiffs knowledge of the 
existence of a party does not foreclose the possibility that she has made a mistake of identity 
about which that party should have been aware, such knowledge does not support that party's 
. . ,329 tnterest tn repose. 
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Justice Sotomayor further stated that the question under Rule 15( c )(1 )(C)(ii) is what the 
prospective defendant reasonably should have understood about the plaintiffs intent in filing the 
original complaint against the first defendant. In light of that fact, Justice Sotomayor held that 
Costa Croci ere had notice that Krupski meant to sue it, and not Costa Cruise. 330 The complaint 
makes clear that Krupski meant to sue the company that owned, operated, managed, supervised 
and controlled the ship on which she was injured, and because it mistakenly identified Costa 
Cruise Lines as performing those roles, Costa Croci ere should have known that it was not named 
as a defendant in the complaint only because of Krupski's misunderstanding about which 
company was in charge of the ship.331 Costa Crociere and Costa Cruise are also closely related 
companies with similar names, and were represented by the same counsel, further evincing the 
fact that Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been named as a 
defendant but for Krupski's mistake. 332 As a result, Justice Sotomayor found that Krupski's 
claim against Costa Crociere did relate back to her original claim against Costa Cruise Lines, and 
was thus not time barred. 
This case demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's desire to ultimately find the truth and have a 
matter litigated. Justice Sotomayor is dedicated to resolving claims on their merits, which can be 
traced back to her afternoons spent watching Perry Mason. Throughout her career, Justice 
Sotomayor has been focused on the pursuit of the truth, and Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is a means in which an otherwise time barred complaint can be heard and 
adjudicated on its merits. Justice Sotomayor's ultimate goal is achieving justice through the 
application of the law to the facts in front of her, and this case squarely demonstrates her 
commonsense application of the law. Rule 15(C) expressly states, "[I]fRule 15(c)(1)(B) is 
330 !d. at 2497. 
331 !d. 
332 !d. at 2498. 
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satisfied and if. .. the party to be brought in by amendment received such notice of the action that 
it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits, and knew or should have known that the 
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's 
identity."333 As a result, the commonsense solution to this case was to apply the plain language 
of Rule 15( c) to Krupski's complaint, thus allowing her to have her claim adjudicated on the 
merits. 
B. Concurrences 
6. United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) 
In this case, the Tohono O'Odham Nation, an Indian Tribe with federal recognition, 
brought two actions against the U.S. government, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty with respect 
to the Nation's lands and other assets.334 The Tohono Nation brought an action against federal 
officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the officials 
responsible for managing the tribal assets held by the federal government breached their 
fiduciary duty.335 The complaint in the District Court requested equitable relief, including an 
accounting of the Nation's assets.336 The Nation also filed a claim in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims describing the same assets and fiduciary duties alleged in the District Court 
complaint for which it reques~oney damages.337 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the 
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 for want of jurisdiction.338 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed, stating that the claims were not for or in respect to the same claim, as there was 
no overlap in the relief requested in each court. 
333 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
334 United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1726-727 (2011). 
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began by evaluating the law in which the Court 
of Federal Claims dismissed the Nation's suit.339 Justice Kennedy pointed out that Congress has 
restricted the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 over a claim if the 
plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to that claim pending against the United States or its 
agents.340 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the question to be resolved is what it means for two 
suits to be "for or in respect to" the same claim.341 According to Keene Corp. v. US., 508 U.S. 
200 (1993), two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially 
the same operative facts, and at least if there is some overlap in the relief requested. 342 
According to Justice Kennedy, the Keene case left open whether the jurisdictional bar also 
operates if the suits are based on the same operative facts but do not seek overlapping relief. 343 
Justice Kennedy pointed to the Keene decision to state that the possible construction of § 1500 
was limited to situations that require substantive factual and some remedial overlap, or 
substantial factual overlap without more.344 
Justice Kennedy concluded by holding that the jurisdictional bar at issue in § 1500 refers 
to situations where the two actions have substantial factual overlap without regard to any 
remedial overlap. 345 Justice Kennedy came to this conclusion by stating that § 1500 bars 
jurisdiction in the Court ofF ederal Claims not only, if the sues on an identical claim elsewhere, 
-~....-'\._ 
but also if the plaintiffs other action is related although not identical to the other claim. 346 
Pointing to§ 1500's broad language, Justice Kennedy stated that it makes clear Congress did not 
intend the statute to be rendered useless by a narrow concept of identity, but suggests a board 
339 Jd 
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prohibition.347 Justice Kennedy stated that, because the statute used similar language elsewhere, 
the jurisdictional bar's application to overlapping facts is the more reasonable interpretation. 348 
In light of the other passage cited by Justice Kennedy, he explained that, "Although the two 
phrases are not identical--one is in respect to a claim, the other a cause of action-they are 
almost so, and there is reason to think that both phrases refer to facts alone and not to relief."349 
Justice Kennedy also stated that reading § 1500 to require only factual and not also 
remedial overlap makes sense in light of the unique remedial powers of the Court ofF ederal 
Claims?50 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court of Federal Claims is the only jurisdiction 
for non-tort requests for significant money damages in the United States, and it has no general 
power to provide equitable relief against the government or its officers. 351 As a result, Justice 
Kennedy stated that the distinct jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims makes overlapping 
relief the exception and distinct relief the norm, and, for that reason, a statute aimed at 
precluding suits in the Court of Federal Claims that duplicate suits elsewhere would be unlikely 
to require remedial overlap?52 Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the statute's purpose is 
to save the government from the burdens of redundant litigation, and that the conclusion that two 
suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same 
operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim. 353 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that, in 
order for a claim to be barred under the jurisdictional limitation of§ 1500, the two cases need 
only share substantially similar facts and not some overlapping relief. 354 
347 ld. 
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Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to state her belief that, 
while she agreed that§ 1500 barred the Nation's action in the Court of Federal Claims, the Court 
should not have decided whether§ 1500 bars an action when the plaintiffs actions share a 
common factual basis but seek different forms of relief. 355 Justice Sotomayor stated that § 1500 
bars jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over any claim that is for or in respect to which 
the plaintiff has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States.356 
Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Court, in Keene, constructed the statute to turn on whether 
the plaintiffs other suit was based on substantially the same operative facts as the Court of 
Claims action, at least if there was some overlap in the reliefrequested.357 The Court in Keene 
found it unnecessary to consider whether§ 1500 barred a Court of Federal Claims claim that was 
based on substantially the same operative facts as another suit but that sought different relief. 358 
Justice Sotomayor believed that, in this case, the Nation sought overlapping relief in the 
District Court and the Court of Federal Claims based on identical facts. 359 Because, in Justice 
Sotomayor's view, the Nation sought overlapping relief in both complaints that were based on 
substantially the same operative facts, § 1500 would have barred its action in the Court of 
Federal Claims and there was no need to reach the broader holding that a claim is barred under § 
1500 if it only shares substantial facts without overlapping relief. 360 As a result, Justice 
Sotomayor would have affirmed the District Court's opinion that the Nation's Court of Federal 
Claims claim was barred by§ 1500, but would have gone no further. 
355 Jd at 1732 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). 
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Justice Sotomayor took issue with the majority's eager dismissal of the judicial restraint 
evidenced in Keene. 361 Justice Sotomayor felt the Court unnecessarily chose to hold that § 1500 
bars jurisdiction in the Court ofF ederal Claims whenever a plaintiffs Court ofF ederal Claims 
action is based on substantially the same facts as a suit pending elsewhere.362 Especially 
irksome, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that on numerous occasions Congress has chosen to 
require plaintiffs to file actions in two different courts to obtain complete relief relating to a 
single set of operative facts.363 As an example, Justice Sotomayor pointed to the fact that the 
Court ofF ederal Claims has no power to issue equitable relief, thus a plaintiff seeking both 
money damages and injunctive relief to remedy distinct harms arising from the same set of facts 
may be forced to file actions in both the Court of Federal Claims and federal district court.364 
However, as Justice Sotomayor explained, "Under the Court's construction of§ 1500, plaintiffs 
whom Congress has forced to file parallel action in the CFC and a district court to obtain 
complete relief must now choose either to forgo relief in the district court or to file first in the 
district court and risk the expiration of the statute of limitations on their claims in the CFC. "365 
In this case, Justice Sotomayor displays much of the same jurisprudence evidenced in 
Krupski. Justice Sotomayor favors judicial restraint in favor of an activist court. This decision 
exemplifies that point. Justice Sotomayor saw no reason to upset the Court's precedent relating 
to§ 1500, as the issue that the Court decided here was not central to the court's conclusion that 
the Nation's action was barred in the Court of Federal Claims. Justice Sotomayor believes that 
the role of the judge is to apply law, not to make law, and the Court's opinion here can be said to 
create law through its own interpretation of§ 1500. Justice Sotomayor concurred only in the 
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judgment of this case because the Court's disposition of the case does not comport with Justice 
Sotomayor's jurisprudence of narrowly construing the law to fit the facts presented. 
7. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) 
Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential philosophy that the Court shall not decide questions 
that will have no effect on the outcome of the case is also prevalent in this case. Justice 
Sotomayor concurred in the Court's judgment, however she did not join the Court's majority 
opinion because she believed it decided a question that held no bearing on the narrow issue at 
hand. 
This case arose out of the alleged material witness arrest of al-Kidd, an American citizen, 
as he was checked in for a flight to Saudi Arabia.366 Al-Kidd was arrested as a material witness 
two days after federal authorities notified a Magistrate Judge that, if al-Kidd boarded the flight to 
Saudi Arabia, they believed information crucial to the prosecution of Sami Omar al-Hussayen 
would be lost.367 As a result, the Magistrate Judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Kidd, and he 
was held in federal custody for the following sixteen days and on federal supervised release until 
al-Hussayen's trial concluded fourteen months later.368 However, the prosecution never called 
al-Kidd as a witness against al-Hussayen.369 
Al-Kidd alleged that, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft authorized federal prosecutors to use the material witness statute to detain 
individuals with suspected ties to terrorists.370 Al-Kidd alleges that the federal officials had no 
intention of calling many of these individuals as witnesses, and that they were detained at 
Ashcroft's direction because they were suspected of ties to terrorist organization, but there was 
366 Ashcroftv. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074,2079 (2011). 
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not sufficient evidence to charge them with a crime.371 It was further alleged that this pretextual 
detention led to the material witness arrest of al-Kidd.372 As a result, al-Kidd filed a Bivens suit 
against Ashcroft, challenging the constitutionality of his alleged policy.373 Ashcroft filed a 
motion to dismiss based on absolute and qualified immunity, which was denied by the District 
Court, and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
pretextual arrests absent probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, and that Ashcroft could not 
1 . l.fi d b 1 . . 374 c aim qua I Ie or a so ute Immunity. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that al-Kidd's Fourth Amendment rights 
were not violated because an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness 
pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of 
allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive.375 The Court also held that 
Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law?76 
Justice Scalia held that al-Kidd's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because his 
arrest was objectively reasonable, and that a validly obtained arrest warrant cannot be challenged 
as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper 
motive?77 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia reasoned that under the Fourth 
Amendment, an arrest must be reasonable under the circumstances, and that this reasonableness 
is predominantly an objective inquiry.378 In determining the reasonableness of an arrest, Justice 
Scalia stated that the Court examines whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the 
371 Jd. 
372 ld. 
373 Jd. 
374 Id. 
375 !d. at 2085. 
376 Id. 
377 Jd. 
378 !d. at 2080. 
57 
challenged action, and if so, that action was reasonable whatever the subjective intent motivating 
the relevant officials. 379 
The two exceptions to objective inquiry of reasonableness are the Court's special needs 
and administrative search cases, where actual motivations do matter.380 Under these 
circumstances, a judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where the search or seizure 
is justified by special needs.381 Justice Scalia quickly reasoned, however, that these cases do not 
apply to situations, as al-Kidd's, where the arrest is based on a properly issued judicial 
warrant.382 As such, Justice Scalia found that al-Kidd's arrest was based on a properly issued 
material witness warrant, thus foregoing any investigation as to Attorney General Ashcroft's 
subjective intent in having al-Kidd detained.383 
Justice Scalia then also held that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity 
because he did not act in violation of clearly established law.384 Justice Scalia reasoned that 
qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff 
pleads facts showing that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and that the right 
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. 385 Justice Scalia continued to 
explain that a government official's conduct violates a clearly established law when, at the time 
of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable 
officer would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. 386 Justice Scalia then 
pointed out that, at the time of al-Kidd's arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext 
could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material witness warrant 
379 !d. 
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unconstitutional.387 As a result of that observation, Justice Scalia held that Attorney General 
Ashcroft deserves qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate any clearly established 
law.388 
. ·r-lx 
Justice Sotomayor, in another display of her committal to judicial restraint and deciding 
/ 
only the narrow question in front of her, concurred in the majority's judgment alone, because she 
believed that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity for the reasons stated in the 
majority's opinion.389 Justice Sotomayor reasoned, however, "I cannot join the majority's 
opinion, however, because it unnecessarily 'resolves a difficult and novel question of 
constitutional interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case. "'390 
Justice Sotomayor believed that whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual 
use of a material witness warrant for preventative detention of an individual whom the 
government has no indication of using at trial is a question not needing an answer in this case.391 
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the Court has never determined whether an official's subjective 
intent matters for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in that context, and the Court need not and 
should not resolve that question in this case. 392 Justice Sotomayor further explained that the 
Court's holding is premised on the existence of a validly issu:~aterial witness warrant, which 
she points out, is questionable, given the al-Kidd's allegations.393 Justice Sotomayor further 
states that, based on the al-Kidd's allegations, it is not clear that it would have been impractical 
to secure his presence by subpoena or that his testimony could be adequately secured by 
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deposition. 394 In Justice Sotomayor's mind, it was also not clear whether the warrant issued to 
secure al-Kidd's arrest was sufficient, as the government failed to disclose that it had no 
intention of utilizing al-Kidd at trial.395 As a result, Justice Sotomayor would have limited the 
Court's holding to which all of its members agreed, that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed 
qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. 396 
Justice Sotomayor firmly believes in judicial restraint. This jurisprudential philosophy is 
evident in her concurrence to the Majority's opinion in this case. The search for truth here does 
not involve resolving a question of constitutional right upon assuming away factual details that 
would be crucial to the matters ultimate adjudication. The Court's holding that the Fourth 
Amendment had not been violated was completely dispensable to its ultimate conclusion that 
Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly 
established law. This case is a prime example of Justice Sotomayor's view that the role of a 
judge is to apply the law, and not to make it. 
8. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) 
In this case the Court was faced with the question of whether the Confrontation Clause 
permiJ:s,.the prosecution from introducing a forensic report containing testimonial certification 
()-~- ~~----- / 
made for the purpose of establishing a particular fact, through the testimony of a scientist who 
did not sign the certification, and did not perform or observe the test reported in the 
certification.397 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that surrogate testimony 
regarding the certification at issue did not comport with the Confrontation Clause, and that 
accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that 
394Jd 
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analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine that particular 
analyst pre-trial.398 
Donald Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated when the vehicle he was 
driving rear-ended a pick-up truck.399 Bullcoming fled the scene of the accident before the 
police arrived, however, he was shortly the~eafter apprehended, and subsequently failed the field 
sobriety tests.400 Bullcoming refuset;e Breathalyzer examination, and as a result, the police 
obtained a warrant authorizing a blood-alcohol analysis.401 Pursuant thereto, Bullcoming was 
taken to a hospital where his blood was taken.402 The police then sent the sample to the New 
Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), in order to be evaluated.403 
Curtis Caylor, completed and signed the SLD forensic report, which stated that Bullcoming had a 
blood alcohol content (BAC) of0.21 grams, an inordinately high level.404 
Caylor, on the report, certified that he had received the sample with an unbroken seal, 
that the information in the report was correct, and that he followed the procedures set out on the 
opposite side of the report. 405 The SLD examiner then certified that Caylor was qualified to 
conduct the BAC test, and that the established procedure for handling and analyzing 
Bullcoming's sample had been followed. 406 According to Justice Ginsburg, the SLD analysts 
utilize a gas chromatograph machine to determine BAC levels, and that the operation of the 
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machine requires specialized knowledge and training. 407 It was also recognized that several steps 
are involved in the gas chromatograph process, and human error can occur at each step. 408 
As a result of the BAC analysis, Bullcoming became subject to New Mexico's 
aggravated DWI charge.409 At trial, the SLD announced that it would not produce Caylor to 
testify as to the analysis' authenticity, because Caylor had subsequently been placed on unpaid 
leave for an unspecified reason.410 The State then proposed to introduce the report as a business 
record during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who neither observed nor 
reviewed Caylor's report.411 Bullcoming's counsel opposed that proposal, stating that the 
prosecution had not disclosed the unavailability of Caylor until trial, and that her entire defense 
may have been different if this information was previously disclosed.412 The trial court 
overruled the objection, and Razatos' testimony regarding the report was admitted.413 The jury 
found Bullcoming guilty ofDWI, which the Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme 
Court affirmed, stating that the BAC report was non-testimonial.414 
Justice Ginsburg held that if an out of court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not 
be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is 
unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to confront the witness.415 Justice Ginsburg 
reasoned that the Confrontation Clause confers upon the accused in all criminal prosecutions, the 
right to be confronted with the witness against him.416 The Court further noted that in order to 
comport with the Confrontation Clause, testimonial evidence is only admissible at trial if the 
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witness who made the statement is unavailable and the opposition had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine him or her.417 Justice Ginsburg also noted that, while Bullcoming's appeal was 
pending, the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).418 The 
Court in Melendez-Diaz held that affidavits reporting forensic analysis submitted to the Court 
qualify as testimonial evidence, rendering the affiant's subject to the Confrontation Clause.419 
As a result, Justice Ginsburg held that an analyst's certification prepared in connection with a 
criminal investigation or prosecution is testimonial, thus subjecting Caylor's report to the 
Confrontation Clause. 420 
As a result of the foregoing analysis, Razatos' testimony regarding the BAC report must 
have comported with the Confrontation Clause. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that 
Razatos' surrogate testimony regarding Caylor's report was adequate to satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause because Caylor simply transcribed the results generated by the gas chromatograph.421 
Justice Ginsburg held, however, that Caylor's report was more than a mere report of a machine 
generated number because Caylor certified that he followed all the relevant procedures and that 
no circumstance or condition affected the validity of the analysis. 422 Such certification rendered 
Caylor's report and Caylor open to cross-examination.423 As a result, because Caylor's report 
was testimonial, and because the state never asserted Caylor's unavailability, the prosecution 
never had a chance at cross examining him regarding the report he submitted.424 Accordingly, 
417 Jd, (citing Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61 (2004). 
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Caylor became a witness that Bullcoming had the right to confront, and Razatos' surrogate 
testimony regarding the report did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.425 
Justice Sotomayor concurred in part to the opinion in order to state her opinion as to why 
the report was testimonial, and also to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion.426 
This concurrence further demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential philosophy that the 
Court's opinions should be narrowly construed to the issue presented, and her belief that the role 
of the judge is to apply the law is clearly displayed in this case, as she wrote separately to 
specifically point out what the Court's opinion did not hold. 
Justice Sotomayor emphasized that she agrees with the Majority that the trial court erred 
in admitting the BAC report at trial because its primary purpose was to create an out-of-court 
substitute for testimony.427 Justice Sotomayor further reasoned that the report at issue in this 
case was testimonial because its primary purpose was to incontrovertibly establish or prove some 
fact. 428 Justice Sotomayor then concluded that the BAC report at issue had as its primary 
purpose establishing evidence that Bullcoming was driving while intoxicated, rendering it 
. . 1429 testimonia . 
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence demonstrates her jurisprudence, however, because she 
wrote separately to identify the factual circumstances that this case does not represent.430 Justice 
Sotomayor observed that: 
425 !d. at 2715-16. 
First, this is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate 
purpose, much less an alternate primary purpose ... Second, this is 
not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, 
or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the 
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scientific test at issue ... Third, this is not a case in which an expert 
witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying 
testimonial report that were not themselves admitted into 
evidence ... Finally, this is not a case in which the State introduced 
only machine-generated results, such as a printout from a gas 
chromatograph. 431 
In addressing these factual circumstances in which the Court's opinion does not address, Justice 
Sotomayor points out that this is not a case in which the Court decided whether a purely machine 
generated printout could be introduced at trial with the testimony of an expert witness. 432 In 
pointing out these circumstances, Justice Sotomayor limited the Court's finding to the specific 
reports at issue in this case. Thus, Justice Sotomayor left open the question as to whether one, or 
any, ofthese circumstances would)\1nfluence the testimonial nature of such a report. 
Justice Sotomayor displayed her goal of applying the law to the specific facts presented, 
and reinforced her philosophy that judges do not make law. By limiting her concurrence to only 
the specific factual circumstances presented in this case, Justice Sotomayor affirmed that her 
name would not be associated with an opinion that created law and foreclosed future arguments 
that can be made for the admittance of evidence where the factual circumstances are different 
than those presented here. 
C. Dissents 
9. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
This case further presents Justice Sotomayor's committal to only resolving the specific 
issue presented to the Court. In this case, Justice Sotomayor dissented, primarily on the basis 
that she viewed the court as creating law, and not merely applying it. 
431 ld at 2722. 
432 ld 
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On January 10, 2000, a shooting occurred outside of a mall in Michigan, injuring two 
people, leaving one of them dead from multiple gun shots.433 The suspect, Thompkins, fled to 
Ohio where he was found and arrested about one year later.434 Thompkins was interrogated by 
two police officers for almost three hours in an eight by ten foot room. 435 At the beginning of the 
interrogation Thompkins was presented with a form that informed him of his Miranda rights, 
which Thompkins read aloud, but refused to sign in order to demonstrate he understood those 
rights. 436 The officers then began the interrogation, in which Thompkins remained 
predominantly silent for the entire three hours.437 Thompkins did not state that he wanted to 
remain silent, but his only verbal responses were an occasional "yeah," "no," or "I don't 
know."438 The only affirmative statements Thompkins made were stating that he did not want a 
peppermint, and that the chair he was sitting in was hard. 439 
Two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, one of the officers asked 
Thompkins, '"Do you believe in God?"440 Thompkins responded by stating, '"Yes. "'441 The 
officer then asked Thompkins, '"Do you pray to God?"442 Thompkins again responded by 
saying, '"Yes. "'443 Then, the officer asked Thompkins, '"Do you pray to God to forgive you for 
shooting that boy down?'"444 Thompkins then answered, "Yes," and looked away from the 
433 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 374 (2010). 
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officer.445 Shortly thereafter, Thompkins refused to sign a written confession, and the 
. . d d 446 Interrogation en e . 
Thompkins was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, 
and other firearms related offenses.447 Thompkins moved to suppress the statements concerning 
his belief in God during the interrogation, arguing that he invoked his right to remain silent under 
Miranda, therefore requiring the officer's to end the interrogation. 448 The trial court denied 
Thompkins' motion, and the jury subsequently found him guilty on all counts.449 On appeal, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Thompkins' guilty verdict and stated that Thompkins did not 
invoke his right to remain silent and that he subsequently waived that right.450 The Michigan 
Supreme Court denied discretionary review, and Thompkins subsequently filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in 
which the District Court rejected Thompkins' argument that he invoked his right to remain 
silent.451 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Thompkins invoked 
his right to remain to silent by holding that an invocation of that right need not be express, and 
because Thompkins remained almost entirely silent for the first two hours and forty-five minutes 
f h . . 452 o t e Interrogation. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, held that Thompkins did not 
invoke his right to remain silent under Miranda, because one who wishes to invoke that right 
must do so unambiguously.453 In rejecting Thompkins' argument that he invoked his right to 
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remain silent by not saying anything for a sufficient amount of time, Justice Kennedy relied on 
the Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which held that a defendant 
wishing to invoke his or her right to counsel, must do so unambiguously.454 Justice Kennedy 
reasoned, the Court had yet to state whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be 
ambiguous or equivocal, but stated that there was no principled reason to adopt different 
standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and 
the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis. 455 
Justifying this holding, Justice Kennedy stated that, requiring a suspect to unambiguously 
invoke the right to remain silent avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers on 
how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.456 Justice Kennedy continued that, if an ambiguous act, 
omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to 
make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequence of 
suppression if they guessed wrong. 457 Accordingly, because Thompkins did not unambiguously 
state that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to speak to the police, the Court held 
that he had not invoked his right to remain silent. 458 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion which evinces her jurisprudential 
commonsense and her philosophy on judicial restraint. Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by 
stating, "The Court also concludes that a suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent 
against such a finding of 'waiver' must, counterintuitively, speak-and must do so with 
sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that construes ambiguity in favor of the 
poli'ce ... The broad rules the Court announces today are also troubling because they are 
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unnecessary to decide this case, which is governed by the deferential standard of review set forth 
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."459 
Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by chastising the majority's downplay of the factual 
circumstances surrounding Thompkins' investigation.460 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that 
Thompkins remained almost completely silent and unresponsive throughout the entirety of the 
interrogation, pointing to the interrogating officer's categorization of the interrogation as "nearly 
a monologue."461 Justice Sotomayor also pointed out that, other than the statements made at the 
end of the interrogation, the only other statements the interrogating officer could remember that 
Thompkins' made were that he did not want a peppermint, and that the chair he was sitting in 
was hard. 462 
Justice Sotomayor, addressing Thompkins' argument that his conduct during the 
interrogation invoked his right to remain silent, stated that she, like the Sixth Circuit, would not 
have reached this question because she believes Thompkins was entitled to relief under 
waiver.463 Justice Sotomayor dissented here because she could not agree with the Court's broad 
ruling that a suspect must clearly invoke his right to silence by speaking.464 According to Justice 
Sotomayor, "[T]oday's novel clear-statement rule for invocation invites police to question a 
suspect at length-notwithstanding his persistent refusal to answer questions-in the hope of 
eventually obtaining a single inculpatory response which will suffice to prove waiver of 
rights."465 
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Justice Sotomayor pointed to several sources for her conclusion that the Majority was 
wrong in its holding. First, Justice Sotomayor stated that Miranda itself concluded that if an 
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to 
remain silent, the interrogation must cease, and that any statement taken after the person invokes 
this privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion.466 Thus, Justice Sotomayor 
believes that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to 
remain silent depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. 467 
Secondly, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court was incorrect in extending the ruling in 
Davis to the right to remain silent.468 As Justice Sotomayor provided, the Court mistakenly 
applied Davis because it involved the right to counsel, not the right to remain silent, and that 
Miranda had recognized the difference between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request 
to remain silent and a request for an attomey.469 Justice Sotomayor, in stating the standard she 
believed to be appropriate, reasoned that, after an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain 
silent, the inquiry should be limited to whether the suspect's right to cut off questioning was 
scrupulously honored by the police.470 According to Justice Sotomayor, this standard is 
precautionary and fact specific, with an ability to acknowledge that some statements or conduct 
are so equivocal that police may scrupulously honor a suspect's rights without terminating 
questioning, and that others, in particular, when a suspect sits silent throughout prolonged 
interrogation, cannot reasonably be understood other than as an invocation of the right to remain 
silent.471 
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Justice Sotomayor further stated that the Davis rule does not comport with the right to 
remain silent because advising a suspect that he has a right to remain silent is unlikely to convey 
that he must speak in order to ensure the right will be protected.472 By contrast, Justice 
Sotomayor reasoned that advising a suspect that he has the right to the presence of an attorney 
implies the need for speech to exercise that right.473 As a result, Justice Sotomayor believes that 
the Court's decision in this case turned Miranda upside down because criminal suspects must 
now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent-which, counterintuitively, requires them 
to speak.474 
This dissent perfectly embodies two of Justice Sotomayor's major jurisprudential tenets. 
First, Justice Sotomayor's advocacy of judicial restraint is on display. Once again, Justice 
Sotomayor would not have reached the conclusion regarding a criminal suspect's invocation of 
his or her right to remain silent, because she believes that decision was not mandated by the 
factual circumstances in front of the court. Justice Sotomayor firmly believes that the role of the 
judge is to apply law, and not to make law. Because Justice Sotomayor believed the AEDP A 
adequately resolved the issue in front of the Court, she believed it unnecessary to reach such a 
broad ruling concerning the Miranda right to silence. Justice Sotomayor thus believes that this 
decision unnecessarily decides a question that, not only was not in front of the Court, but also 
has wide implications for constitutional rights. 
Second, this opinion fits squarely within Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential 
commonsense application of the law. As Justice Sotomayor sees it, Davis' holding, that an 
unambiguous statement is needed in order to invoke the right to counsel does not parallel 
Thompkins' invocation of his right to remain silent. Furthermore, a rule respecting the right of a 
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criminal suspect to remain silent does not imply that he or she must do the opposite-speak-in 
order to invoke that right. As a result, Justice Sotomayor does not believe the Court's holding to 
be a commonsense application of its precedent, or a commonsense application of human nature. 
10. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) 
This case, in which Justice Sotomayor dissented, involves Congress' enactment of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and whether Arizona's Legal Arizona Workers 
Act, which provides that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ 
unauthorized aliens may be suspended or revoked, is expressly and impliedly preempted by 
federal immigration law.475 The Majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded 
that Arizona's licensing law is not expressly preempted, and that Arizona's E-verify mandate is 
. 1. dl d 476 not 1mp 1e y preempte . 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) makes it unlawful for a person or other 
entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien 
knowing ~.the alien is an unauthorized alien.477 Employers that violate that 
prohibition may be subjected to federal civil and criminal sanctions, and IRCA also expressly 
preempts any state or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions, other than through licensing 
and similar laws, upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment 
h . d 1. 478 unaut onze a 1ens. 
Under Arizona's Legal Arizona Workers Act, the state allows Arizona courts to suspend 
or revoke the licenses necessary to do business in the state if an employer knowingly or 
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intentionally employs an unauthorized alien.479 Under the Arizona law, if an employer is found 
to have knowingly employed an unauthorized alien, the court must order the employer to 
terminate the employment of all unauthorized aliens and file quarterly reports on all new hires 
for a probationary period of three years.480 The court may also order the appropriate agencies to 
suspend all licenses that are held by the employer for a period not to exceed ten business days.481 
A second knowing violation requires that the court permanently revoke all licenses that are held 
by the employer specific to the business location where the unauthorized alien performed 
work.482 
Chief Justice and the Majority concluded that Arizona's law is not expressly preempted 
by IRCA because the law falls within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the 
states.483 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that, while IRCA prohibits states from imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions on those who employ unauthorized aliens, it preserves the state's authority to 
impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws.484 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the 
Arizona law is not preempted because it merely instructs courts to suspend or revoke the 
business licenses of in-state employers that employ unauthorized aliens.485 Also, because 
Arizona's definition of "license" in its law is substantially similar to the definition of "license" 
that Congress codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court held that Arizona's law 
does precisely what IRCA authorizes the states to do.486 Accordingly, because Chief Justice 
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Roberts believes that Arizona's law falls within the plain text of the preemption exception of 
IRCA, Arizona's law is not preempted.487 
Unlike many of Justice Sotomayor's dissents and concurrences, in this case, her dissent 
focuses entirely on a differing view of the legislative history of IRCA. Justice Sotomayor, in 
opening her dissent, states, "In enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA), Congress created a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens 
in the United States. The Court reads !RCA's saving clause-which preserves from preemption 
state 'licensing and similar laws '-to permit states t~ to determine for themselves whether 
someone has employed an unauthorized alien so long as they do so in conjunction with licensing 
sanctions. This reading of the saving clause cannot be reconciled with the rest ofiRCA's 
comprehensive scheme."488 This dissent thus points to Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential view 
that when determining the meaning of a term within a statute, it is necessary to look past its plain 
meaning. As a result of looking at the comprehensive scheme enacted by Congress in IRCA, 
Justice Sotomayor concludes that the saving clause can only be understood to preserve a state's 
authority to impose licensing sanctions after a final federal determination that a person has 
violated IRCA. 489 
Justice Sotomayor reached this conclusion by reasoning that the plain text ofiRCA 
expressly preempts states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions, other than through licensing 
and similar laws, upon those who employ unauthorized aliens.490 Justice Sotomayor emphasized 
that Arizona's law imposes civil sanctions on employers, thus allowing the act to escape IRCA 
487 ld 
488 Id at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
489 ld 
490 ld 
74 
express preemption only if it falls within the licensing saving clause.491 As Justice Sotomayor 
explains, because the plain text of the saving clause is not clear, in that it does not define 
"licensing," nor does it use the term "licensing" in any other provision.492 As a result, Justice 
Sotomayor reasons that it is necessary to look to the text of IRCA as a whole in order to 
illuminate Congress' intent. 493 
Justice Sotomayor then goes into an in depth analysis of the history of IRCA, and an 
analysis of the evils in which it was enacted to counteract.494 Through examining this history, 
and analyzing !RCA's text in whole, Justice Sotomayor reasons that Arizona's law is expressly 
preempted because: 1) Congress expressly displaced the myriad state laws that imposed civil and 
criminal sanctions on employers, thus making it clear that Congress could not have made its 
intention to preempt state and local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions any more clear; 2) 
Congress centralized in the federal government enforcement of IRCA' s prohibition on the 
knowing employment of unauthorized aliens; 3) Congress provided persons adversely affected 
by an agency order with a right of review in the federal courts of appeals; 4) Congress created a 
uniquely federal system by which employers must verify the work authorization status of new 
hires; and 5) Congress created no mechanism for states to access information regarding an 
alien's work authorization status for purposes of enforcing state prohibitions on the employment 
of unauthorized aliens. 495 Justice Sotomayor thus concluded that these provisions collectively 
demonstrate Congress' intent to build a centralized, exclusively federal scheme for determining 
whether a person has employed an unauthorized alien. 496 
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Justice Sotomayor then reasoned that IRCA's saving clause must be construed against 
that backdrop. Concluding that the statutory scheme as a whole defeat's Arizona's and the 
majority's reading of the saving clause, Justice Sotomayor stated that Congress would not 
sensibly have permitted states to determine for themselves whether a person has employed an 
unauthorized alien, while at the same time creating a specialized federal scheme for making such 
a determination, withholding from the states the information necessary to make such a 
determination.497 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that, she believes, the proper reading 
of the saving clause to mean that states may impose licensing sanctions following a final federal 
determination that a person has violated IRCA. 498 
This dissent demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's philosophy on statutory construction, and 
how to determine Congressional intent. Justice Sotomayor believes that the correct course of 
action is to determine what the comprehensive scheme of the entire statute is when the plain 
meaning of the clause or term at issue is not crystal clear. Such an investigation more clearly 
indicates what Congress intended in enacting the statute, clause, or term at issue. This 
demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's never-ending search for the truth, believing that a cursory 
determination of plain meaning is not enough to determine Congressional intent in all but the 
most unambiguous cases. 
IV. Conclusion 
The cases reviewed here, read in light of Justice Sotomayor's upbringing and early life, 
shed valuable light on her jurisprudence. Namely, in each opinion, concurrence, or dissent 
written by Justice Sotomayor, she engages in a thorough analysis of the facts of the case, a 
description of the case's procedural posture, an in-depth and technical explanation of the current 
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law, an acknowledgment of the opposition's stance, an often narrow, commonsense application 
of the law to the facts, and a conclusion. The cases analyzed here also establish Justice 
Sotomayor's belief that statutory interpretation and the determination of Congressional intent 
must be made in light of the complete, comprehensive history and scheme of the legislation. 
This belief can be traced back to her childhood, and her fascination with Perry Mason and the 
pursuit of the truth that led her to a career in law. These cases also reveal perhaps the most 
prevalent jurisprudential philosophy held by Justice Sotomayor: that she believes the role of the 
judge is to apply law, and not to make it. Justice Sotomayor firmly believes in judicial restraint. 
As evidenced through her case law, her opinions often construe the law to a narrow application 
of the facts of the case, and most of her dissents and concurrences emphasize the fact that she 
does not think the Court narrowed its disposition sufficiently. As a result of the foregoing 
analysis, Justice Sotomayor can be said to apply a commonsense application of the law to the 
facts in front of her. 
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